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Moving from puritanic rigidity to psychedelic abandon,
the conflict of laws ... has once again been led into a
dead-end alley. The harsh conceptualism that Cardozo
described [in the vested rights system] has been
replaced by shallow sophistry. Currie's theories and
terminology pervade American conflicts jurisprudence
to such an extent that it may not be possible to discard
them without a change of our legal language.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws2 has the irony of
dominating the field while bewildering its users. 3 The result is a set of
1. Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict ofLaws: A Critique oflnterest Analysis, 32 AM.
J. COMP. L. 1, 50 (1984).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
3. As of 2003, twenty-four states use the Second Restatement for choice of law in
contract cases, and twenty-one use it for torts. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
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choice-of-law decisions so lacking in uniformity that the Second
Restatement's balancing test has become chimeric, taking on vastly
different forms in different courts.4 Erratic applications may be partly
due to its code-like function, which can require the application of two
or more black letter sections, each with multiple analytical steps.
5
Critics also point to the political and academic compromises that
pervaded the American Law Institute's drafting process for this project,
leading to ambiguity in some sections.6 But a far larger problem in
state and federal courts throughout the United States is significant
deviation from the Second Restatement's multifactored test to single-
factor tests, directly caused by the persistence of two radically different
methodologies-the First Restatement's territorially fixed lex locus test
and Brainerd Currie's governmental-interest analysis. Scholars
surveying this phenomenon have reported, on the one hand, cases
Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 1,
4 (2004) (noting the continuing accuracy of the choice-of-law tables published in
EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 14 (3d ed. Supp. 2001)). None of the
other four choice-of-law methods currently adopted in the United States approach this
level of acceptance, as the Scoles treatise's pie graphs demonstrate. EUGENE F.
SCOLES, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 11-12 (3d ed. Supp. 2001). But these charts
measure only official adoptions. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L.
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 214 n.3 (3d ed. 2003) (stating that
the number of official adoptions understates the Second Restatement's influence as
persuasive authority in states using other methods and in federal courts applying
federal choice-of-law rules). For discussions of its confounding nature and other
criticisms, see generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 7-8, 357-59, 460-64 (4th ed. 2001); Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial
Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV.
1248 (1997) [hereinafter Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance]; Russell J. Weintraub, "At
Least, To Do No Harm": Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the
Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284 (1997) [hereinafter Weintraub,
Hippocratic Standard]. See also infra notes 132-99 and accompanying text.
4. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 238 and sources cited therein
(discussing the varied application of the Second Restatement in different courts).
5. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-80 (Tex. 1990)
(applying Second Restatement §§ 187, 188, and 196 in a contract dispute to determine
that Texas law would apply because Texas has a materially greater interest in the case
at bar than Florida).
6. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 205-06 n.4. This is a mild statement
of criticism of the Second Restatement. See, e.g., Symeonides, JudicialAcceptance,
supra note 3, at 1249-50 n.3 (citing criticism of the Second Restatement for
compromising too much between conflicting philosophers and being "too vague,
exceedingly elastic, unpredictable, directionless, and rudderless"). See also infra
notes 195-218 and accompanying text (discussing the development of choice-of-law
analysis in Texas).
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limited to contact counting that mimic the First Restatement, and, on
the other, cases relying too heavily or even entirely on perceived
governmental interests. 7 But no long-term study has yet measured this
error in the controlled setting of a single state.
Second Restatement adoptions necessarily assume different
forms in different states, even without aberrational applications. To
avoid inappropriate comparisons, a study is best focused on a single
state large enough to produce a sample. This Article quantifies the
deviations by examining Texas practice in the twenty-four years from
Texas's 1979 adoption of the Second Restatement's most-significant-
relationship test for tort cases. As the most populous state using the
Second Restatement for both tort and contract cases, Texas may be the
ideal laboratory. 8 Because the contact-counting deviation is simply
detected and clearly inappropriate under the Second Restatement,
those cases in which contact counting is employed are merely listed.9
The study accordingly focuses on the more complicated task of
isolating the Currie-inspired misapplications.
In spite of drafting compromises and some aberrational
applications, the Second Restatement's balancing approach works when
properly applied, as the majority of Texas courts have done. 10 This
study of misapplications is meant to improve choice-of-law analyses,
and, in the longer term, underscore the need for fine tuning the choice-
of-law test in the courts, the legislature, or the American Law Institute.
7. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 214-16 and sources cited therein
(discussing cases that require only a weighing of state interests and decide by "crude
contact counting"); Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement:
Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REv. 1232, 1233 (1997)
(mentioning commentators who have noted courts applying the "better rule of law");
Weintraub, Hippocratic Standard, supra note 3, at 1289-90 (citing cases in which
contacts were counted).
8. New York and California use other choice-of-law tests, and Florida uses the
Second Restatement only for torts. Illinois and Ohio are the other populous states
using the Second Restatement for both torts and contacts. See SCOLES, supra note 3,
at 85 (listing states and their choice-of-law methodologies).
9. See infra note 191 (listing twelve contact-counting cases decided in Texas
courts applying the Second Restatement).
10. See infra note 160 (listing well-reasoned Texas state and federal decisions
applying the Second Restatement). An especially good example is Maxus Exploration




II. THE TEXAS STUDY
Texas state and federal courts apply the wrong choice-of-law
test one out of five times. This is not to say that they apply the test
wrong-they sometimes do-but that they apply the wrong test. In
21.01% of the civil cases invoking the most-significant-relationship
test, Texas courts are applying the Currie governmental-interest
analysis or some aspect of it. Some may perceive these tests as eclectic
and believe that mixing them to fit the occasion is appropriate. But in
chemistry, cooking, and conflicts law, some formulas do not mix.II
Although the Second Restatement is itself eclectic, it is incompatible
with the governmental-interest analysis developed by Brainerd Currie
and others. The biggest difference is that in Currie's approach,
speculative governmental interests drive the analysis, while under the
Second Restatement, governmental interests are merely a factor-albeit
an important one-to be balanced against several others. In its pure
form, Currie's obtuse method is used in only three states, and there only
for tort issues. 
12
The best example of their incompatible differences is the false
conflict. Under Currie's approach, a false conflict occurs when the
court determines that only one state has a true interest in the dispute.13
That determination ends the analysis; and the interested state's law is
11. Robert Leflar wrote of the "current American eclecticism." ROBERT LEFLAR,
ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 391-93 (4th ed. 1986). But it has been a current
phenomenon at least since Beale's time. See generally Joseph H. Beale, What Law
Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. REV. 1, 79 (1909) (setting out the
rules of each state regarding what law governs the validity of a contract). See also
SCOLES, supra note 3, at 79-83, 687 (noting the lack of certainty in the law in many
states and citing specific examples). For a criticism of eclecticism, see William A.
Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice ofLaw: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER
L. REV. 645 (1983) (calling most examples of eclecticism deplorable).
12. California, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia currently use interest
analysis as their common-law choice-of-law rule for tort cases. SCOLES, supra note
3, at 85. In addition, the Scoles treatise reports that nine states follow a "combined
approach"-three for contracts only and six for contracts and torts-that can include
interest analysis (as a test and not merely as a factor), and some states purporting to
use the Second Restatement are in fact applying a "grouping of contacts" approach;
others apply a restrained interest analysis. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 82. In a separate
study, Scoles's co-author, Patrick Borchers, has reported that four states-California,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New Jersey-use Currie's interest analysis. Patrick J.
Borchers, Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
350, 373 (1992).
13. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 107
(1963).
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applied. 14 The Second Restatement does not use this term at all and
does not recognize the concept of governmental interests as dispositive,
except for a few procedural' 5 and property 16 issues. In the vast
majority of most-significant-relationship applications, a state's lack of
interest would merely decrease the likelihood of its law's selection.
Currie's false conflict cannot be grafted onto a Second Restatement
analysis without defeating the latter's essential function.
A second example of incompatibility relates to the interests
themselves. Because Currie's approach turns on interest analysis,' 7 it
depends on the court's ability to ascertain the applicable governmental
interests of its own state and others, and to do so in every conflict-of-
laws setting. The Second Restatement, on the other hand, does not
require interest analysis when no discernable interests exist; its other
factors then provide the solution.
The practice produces as much irony as error. Some courts
using the wrong test apply it correctly and produce a fair result, at least
to the extent that a pure interest analysis is capable of a fair result.
Conversely, some courts applying the right test do it so poorly that the
result is bad, or at least doubtful. The Second Restatement is far from
perfect and is to blame for some of the misdirection. More
blameworthy is Texas's seminal choice-of-law decision-Duncan v.
14. Id.
15. For most procedural issues, the Second Restatement mandates forum law.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971) (stating the
general rule of forum law governing procedural issues). One exception is exemption
from judgment execution, for which the Second Restatement presumes the application
of forum law "unless another state, by reason of such circumstances as the domicil of
the creditor and the debtor within its territory, has the dominant interest in the
question of exemption." Id. § 132. See Bergman v. Bergman, 888 S.W.2d 580, 585
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ) (applying this rule and finding that Texas law
governs). Similarly, for the issues of burden of proof, the burden of going forward
with the evidence, and presumptions, the Second Restatement provides that forum law
applies "unless the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the otherwise
applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than to regulate the conduct of
the trial." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 133-34. Although
governmental interest is not identified here, the primary purpose wording and the
clause's dispositive nature fit it neatly into governmental interest analysis.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223. Comment b
discusses dominant interest as an apparently dispositive factor for the law governing
the validity and effect of land conveyances, although the black-letter language does
not use that term or mention interest analysis. See Pellow v. Cade, 990 S.W.2d 307,
314 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (applying Second Restatement comment
b's dominant interest test).
17. CURRIE, supra note 13, at 107.
494 [Vol. 23:3
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Cessna Aircraft Co. 18-one of only two Texas Supreme Court cases
employing aspects of Currie's interest analysis.
This Article examines the phenomenon in twenty-five Texas-
based cases using aspects of Currie's formula, ranging from a pure
interest analysis to a lesser borrowing of concepts and vocabulary. By
"borrowing of concepts and vocabulary," I do not mean that every use
of governmental interest was counted here as a Currie example. To the
contrary, a proper Second Restatement analysis should consider any
governmental interests at stake. Rather, this critique is limited to cases
that use governmental-interest analysis as the choice-of-law test rather
than as a factor, as explained below.
19
Part II defines the scope and methodology of this study. Part III
is a brief history of American and Texas conflicts law, highlighting
three choice-of-law systems pertinent to current Texas usage-the
"traditional" lex locus system, Currie's interest analysis, and the
Second Restatement's most-significant-relationship test. Part IV
examines the twenty-five Currie-leaning cases, organized by court
system and starting with the Texas Supreme Court. Part V reiterates
four points established in this study and recommends a proper use of
interest analysis in a Second Restatement framework.
Terminology is important in this discussion. Indeed, the misuse
of terminology is endemic to conflicts law and is one of the fallacies
committed in some cases discussed here. The following terms and their
precise meanings, as I am using them, are central to this article and are
arranged here not in alphabetical order, but in conceptual succession.
Term Meaning
State refers to a sovereign entity (the United States,
Mexico), or subdivision (Texas, Nuevo Leon)
with legislative authority.
20
Foreign law means any law other than forum law. For
18. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
19. See infra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Safway
Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied)).
20. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 (defining state as "a
territorial unit with a distinct general body of law"). I modified that definition
somewhat to emphasize subordinate states in a federal system and to make the point
that the conflicting law may come from a co-equal subordinate state (Oklahoma), from
another sovereign nation (Canada), or from a subordinate unit of that sovereign
(Ontario).
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American states, the term foreign law does not
include federal law because conflicts between
state and federal law are governed by different
choice-of-law tests not discussed in this
Article.
Choice of law is used interchangeably in this Article with
conflict of laws and means the court's act of
selecting the applicable law in a given case. It
does not refer to choices made by parties,
which may not be valid choices from the
court's perspective.
Comity is a discretionary doctrine of the common law
and international law by which one state will
honor the substantive laws, judgments, or
21official requests of another state.
Lex locus test refers to the choice-of-law process promoted
by Story22 and Beale23 that chooses the
21. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839)
(describing comity as "the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered" that
"contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a
friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong"). See also
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (using comity as the basis for recognition of
foreign judgments).
22. Joseph Story-Harvard law professor and Supreme Court justice-wrote what
functioned as the First Restatement's precursor. See generally JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1841). Story's treatise was the
English language's first comprehensive look at the subject, and it guided American,
English, and, to some extent, European courts, with an influence that lends irony to his
reduction to a footnote in any history of conflicts.' See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 18-20
(describing Story's early influence on the subject of conflicts of law). Story's system
used lex locus concepts, and although it clearly laid the groundwork for vested rights,
it instead subscribed to a much less rigid notion of comity as its legal justification.
Early Texas cases relied on Story. E.g., Huff v. Folger, Lamb & Co., Dallam 530, 531
(Tex. 1843) (citing Story's commentaries as the rule of decision); Hays v. Cage, 2
Tex. 501, 505 (1847) (citing Story throughout).
23. Joseph Beale's vested-rights theories dominated the first half of the twentieth
century and remain an influence today. His three-volume conflicts treatise paralleled
the First Restatement, for which he was Reporter or chief architect. Beale used
Holmes's vested-rights notion to take Story's territorial concepts in a new direction.
The premises were that: (1) law is territorial; (2) an obligation breached in one state











governing law by the location of a specific
event, such as the place of the injury. It is
synonymous with lex loci, and intertwined with
vested rights, although Story used it with
comity.
refers to the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
is the underlying theory in the First
Restatement, holding that a plaintiffs claim
arises when and where the last necessary
element occurs, thus placing the claim under
that territory's law.
refers to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). Judicial quotations
also may use Restatement or Restatement
(Second) to mean Second Restatement.
refers to the Second Restatement's choice-of-
law process in the absence of a controlling
statute. In court usage, the term sometimes
means only the Second Restatement section 6
and sometimes means a collection of sections
working together. The latter meaning is more
accurate.
refers to sections in the Second Restatement.
is synonymous with state-interest analysis and
governmental-interest analysis, but its
meaning beyond that is ambiguous and
depends on the context.24 Its simplest meaning
is the assessment of a given law's purpose and
the extent to which that purpose can be
not in the sense of enforcing the right, but in the sense of creating the right when the
operative events occurred. See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAW (1935). See also SCOLES, supra note 3, at 20-22.
24. Peter K. Westen, False Conflicts, 55 CAL. L. REv. 74, 76-78 (1967) (noting
that the term "false conflict" has at least seven meanings).
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realized by application to a specific dispute.
When used in reference to the Second
Restatement, it is most often a factor to be
balanced against other policies. When used
as a choice-of-law test (rather than as a factor),
the term interest or state interest can also be a
conclusion flowing from the various contacts
in the case.
Other conflicts terms appear in the text and are defined there.
III. A PUNCTUATED HISTORY OF CONFLICTS LAW IN AMERICA
AND IN TEXAS
Theoretical justification is a central issue in conflicts law. Why
does one state apply another's law? Fairness? Party expectation?
Consistency? Forum law's lack of extraterritorial effect? Because the
other law is "better"? These questions lead to another: "Must the forum
apply another law, and if so, why?" Due process? 26 Full faith and
credit? 27 Comity?
28
25. In a few instances, the Second Restatement uses governmental interest as a
strongly presumptive factor. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 178 cmt. b (determining damages for wrongful death). For a few property and
procedural issues, governmental interest is a dispositive factor. See supra notes 15-
16.
26. Due process would not dictate the application of another state's law, but
merely the nonapplication of an unconnected state's law. See Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (holding that Kansas court had proper
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in class action because they were given a chance to opt out,
but the court improperly applied Kansas law because state did not have significant
contact with each class member).
27. See id. (explaining that a judgment issued without proper personal
jurisdiction over an absent party is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere, and,
thus, has no res judicata effect as to that party). On April 23, 2003, the Supreme
Court appeared to overrule Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981), and
to eliminate full faith and credit as a constitutional limit on choice-of-law analyses:
"In light of this experience, we abandon the balancing of interests approach to
conflicts of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt,
538 U.S. 488,495 (2003). The ruling affirmed a Nevada Supreme Court opinion that
allowed a Nevada resident to sue a California state tax agency under Nevada's relaxed
immunity standards, rather than under California's complete immunity. Under the
former precedent, states faced with choice-of-law questions were constitutionally
required to assess the interests of the competing states and, at the very least, weigh
498 [Vol. 23:3
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Attempting answers, conflicts law has undergone significant
and sometimes volatile theoretical shifts from time to time, both in the
those interests in deciding which law to apply. California urged the Court to retain
interest balancing at least where "core sovereignty" interests were at stake. The Court
declined, pointing to the inherent difficulties in interest balancing: "Without a rudder
to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate
States' competing sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause." Id. at 499. The Court left considerable room in its analysis for
refining this radical statement later, observing: "States' sovereignty interests are not
foreign to the full faith and credit command. But we are not presented here with a
case in which a State has exhibited a 'policy of hostility to the public Acts' of a sister
State." Id. (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)). Of course,
Franchise Tax Board affects only the Constitution's role in choice of law and does
nothing to undermine states' continued use of interest analysis as a choice-of-law tool.
28. English scholar Albert Dicey pointed out that comity meant more than
courtesy, and that the doctrine implied an obligation:
If on the other hand, the assertion that the recognition or enforcement of
foreign laws depends upon comity is meant to imply that, to take a
concrete case, when English judges apply French law, they do so out of
courtesy to the French Republic, then the term 'comity' is used to cover a
view which, if really held by any serious thinker, affords a singular
specimen of confusion of thought produced by laxity of language. The
application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option; it does not
arise from the desire of the sovereign of England or of any other
sovereign to show courtesy to other states. It flows from the impossibility
of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without gross
inconvenience and injustice to litigants, whether natives or foreigners.
A.V. DICEY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 10-11 (5th ed. 1932), quoted in HERBERT F.
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 8-9 (2d ed. 1938).
Times change, and a later version of Dicey reads:
It was at one time supposed that the doctrine of comity was a sufficient
basis for the conflict of laws; and even today references to comity are
sometimes found in English judgments. But it is clear that English courts
apply e.g. French law in order to do justice between the parties, and not
from any desire to show courtesy to the French Republic, nor even in the
hope that if English courts apply French law in appropriate cases, French
courts will be encouraged in appropriate cases to apply English law.
Moreover, the doctrine of comity is quite irreconcilable with the
application of the law of an enemy country in time of war, which is a
commonplace when justice between the parties requires it.
A.V. DICEY & J.C.H. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (11 th ed. 1987) (citations
omitted).
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United States and throughout the world.29 The jurisprudential camps
include the statutists, 30 the territorialists,
31 personal-law advocates, 32
and forum-law hardliners who eschew the application of foreign law.33
Additionally, two overlaying theories raise the issue to one of
international law. The first is that choice of law should not be
29. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 4-152 for a thorough historical account of these
shifts.
30. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 10-18. Statutists sought to resolve conflicting laws
by distinguishing between real statutes that operated locally and personal statutes that
had extraterritorial effect, at least for persons owing allegiance to that sovereign.
Thus, a forum would apply its own real statutes but would apply the personal statute
appropriate to each party. The system did not work. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 11
(noting drawbacks to the system).
31. Territorialism emphasizes where key events occurred and tends to be rule
oriented rather than policy oriented. It is a feature of many conflicts theories, but
vested rights may be its best example. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 20-22 (noting that
Beale's vested-rights theory was highly influential, if controversial, until the 1950s).
Dutch scholar Ulrich Huber is an earlier example of territorialism without vested
rights. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 14-15 (describing Huber's idea of "comity,"
which was reinforced by Story's commentaries).
32. The personal-law theory is that laws regulating private conduct and
relationships, such as spousal immunity or guest-host immunity, should follow the
parties and should be applied in other states faced with that issue. See SCOLES, supra
note 3, at 11-13 ("Real statutes were those that operated only within the territory of
the enacting state and not beyond. In contrast, personal statutes operated beyond the
territory of the enacting state and bound all persons that owed allegiance to it.").
Fourteenth-century European statutists subscribed to this view. See SCOLES, supra
note 3, at 11-13 (discussing the significance of this theory and one of its early
proponents, Bartolus of Sassoferrato, during the 1300s). But the personal-law concept
was conceived long before in the Roman Empire. See STORY, supra note 22, at 1-7
(describing the Roman Empire's practice ofpermitting subjugated groups and cultures
to maintain legal systems that applied only to that group). Personal-law advocates
apply the theory objectively, both to forum residents and foreigners, but Currie had a
special limited view of personal law (sometimes called "Currie's personal law view")
that favored forum residents but discriminated against foreigners by not recognizing
their personal laws. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 37 nn.56-57 (citing John Hart Ely,
Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 173, 173-78 (1983)).
33. Currie's governmental-interest analysis is the best example of a forum-
favoring choice-of-law rule. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 704-09 (noting that Currie's
approach leads to findings of false conflicts, in which case forum law will usually be
applied, and of true conflicts, in which case forum law should always be applied).
Another example is Texas under the dissimilarity doctrine, which allows a court to
dismiss a case that would otherwise be governed by a foreign law dissimilar to the
forum's law. See, e.g., Slater v. Mex. Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 127-30 (1904) (citing
to Texas case law that deemed dissimilarities between Texas and Mexico law as too
great to permit an action in Texas courts).
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determined by each forum but instead by international conflicts rules
that would uniformly determine which state's law governs.3 4 The
second dispenses with the need for conflicts rules and holds that
matters transcending borders should be governed by laws that transcend
borders. Although public international law has not generally concerned
itself with private disputes, one exception is lex mercatoria, or law
merchant, an ancient commercial law tied to no one state. It is used
internationally and was used in the United States until the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
35
History is important to conflicts practice. Attorneys wishing to
challenge a court's choice-of-law approach would do well to begin at
the beginning and to learn the lineage of these various choice-of-law
methodologies. But that history is a bit too involved and too
interwoven for this discussion. To understand the current problem in
Texas, only three choice-of-law tests are important. The first is the
vested-rights theory, best identified in case law by the lex locus
terminology and "codified" in the First Restatement; the second is
Currie's governmental-interest analysis; and the third is the Second
Restatement's most-significant-relationship test. These methods are
distinct in their underlying justifications, but they intersect in a few
places, and the Second Restatement embraces some aspects of the other
two tests. For example, familiarity with the First Restatement sheds
light on the intent behind the Second Restatement. Similarly,
governmental-interest analysis is the essential element in two of the
seven balancing factors found in section 6 of the Second Restatement.
On the other hand, the First Restatement and interest analysis have
34. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-107 (1967)
(discussing a priori theory at length). See also SCOLES, supra note 3, at 41 & n.19
(citing Ehrenzweigh).
35. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private
International Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133 (2000) (analyzing the connection, if any,
between lex mercatoria and private international law). For the point of lex
mercatoria's use in the United States until the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, see generally LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMMERCIAL LAW 97-102 (1983) (proposing that the legal diminution of the freedom
to transfer across national boundaries undermines the autonomy of business
obligations); Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 passim (1987) (discussing how Llewellyn's
Sales Act, based in part on the merchant law and used as the initial draft of Articles 1
and 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, has since been largely ignored); and Charles
A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The
Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351 passim
(1983) (tracing the development of American commercial law).
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absolutely nothing in common. This section briefly will outline these
three methodologies, discussing their similarities, distinctions, and
underlying philosophy. It will then illustrate the use of these
methodologies in Texas courts up to Texas's adoption of the most-
significant-relationship test, providing a foundation for Part IV, which
will analyze Texas courts' misuse of interest analysis.
A. Three Distinct Choice-of-Law Systems
American courts have used at least three distinct choice-of-law
approaches since colonial times, and those three can in turn be sub-
categorized into many more. 36 Especially since the choice-of-law
revolution began in the 1950s, judges and scholars have proposed a
variety of choice-of-law approaches-some designed to cure specific
ills in a particular predecessor method, and some touted as panaceas
that would order the litigation universe and end the need for further
discussion. This discussion will examine only the three most
influential of those systems: the traditional lex locus system, Currie's
governmental-interest analysis, and the Second Restatement.
1. Lex Locus, Vested Rights, and the First
Restatement
As expressed in the First Restatement, the vested rights or lex
locus system looks like this:
§ 377. The Place of Wrong
The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.
§ 378. The Law Governing a Plaintiffs Injury
36. The simplest classification of choice-of-law rules includes the territorialist
lex locus sytem, the rule-selecting governmental-interest analysis, and the various
balancing approaches such as the most-significant-relationship test. The Scoles
treatise lists seven currently in use. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 85 (setting out a
table that shows the choice-of-law balancing approaches each state uses for both
contract and tort law). If Story's more flexible version of lex locus is counted
separately from Beale's vested-rights system, and if we attempt to catalogue the mix-
and-match tendencies of American courts, then the most detailed enumeration of




The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury.
§ 384. Recognition of Foreign Causes of Action
(1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of
wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other
states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no
recovery in tort can be had in any other state.
37
These choice-of-law rules for torts were not published in this
form until 1934, but they reflect precedents dating back to 1802 in the
United States, 38 and to the mid-eighteenth century in England.
39
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll,40 a well-known
example of the U.S. precedents, held that unfavorable Mississippi law
37. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-78,384 (1934). These
few sections illustrate the First Restatement's content, but they do not begin to
illustrate the detail that critics often ignore. For example, First Restatement § 379
addresses the "Law Governing Liability-Creating Conduct" and provides that
"[e]xcept as stated in § 382, the law of the place of wrong determines: (a) whether a
person is responsible for harm he has caused only if he intended it, (b) whether a
person is responsible for unintended harm he has caused only if he was negligent, (c)
whether a person is responsible for harm he has caused irrespective of his intention or
the care which he has exercised." Section 382 provides exceptions for persons
required by law to act or not to act, and persons who act under privilege. These
sections and their comments are but some examples of the First Restatement's
clarification not only of detail, but also of a nuance that might have produced better
decisions had it been applied more carefully. This is not to say that vested rights is a
good theory-only that the First Restatement was capable of better results than courts
achieved with it.
38. See McCandlish v. Cruger, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 377,378 (S.C. Constitutional Ct.
App. 1802) (applying the rule, drawn from English precedents, that when a contract is
to be performed in a different jurisdiction than where it was made, the law of the place
of performance governs, and thus applying "Carolina law" to this suit on a bill of
exchange made in St. Croix).
39. See PETER M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE & NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-19 (13th ed. 1999) (discussing England's development of
conflicts law later than European countries, and citing to England's first conflicts
cases: Shelling v. Farmer, 93 Eng. Rep. 756, 1 Stra. 646 (1725) (holding that actions
on foreign real property were not litigable in England); Pipon v. Pipon, 88 Eng. Rep.
544 (1744) (explaining in dictum that intestate's personal property is distributed under
the law of decedent's domicile at death, but resolving the case on other grounds);
Robinson v. Bland, 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 2 Burr. 1077 (K.B. 1760) (concerning an
English action on a French gambling debt)).
40. 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
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governed an Alabama railroad worker's crippling, job-related injury
even though the employment relationship was centered in Alabama and
the underlying negligence in linking rail cars had occurred there.41 The
negligent linking could have failed at any point in the trip, but the fact
that it occurred in Mississippi, which did not recognize fellow-servant
liability, denied plaintiffs statutory Alabama remedy.42 Rejecting
Carroll's argument that Alabama law should control as the situs of the
negligence, 43 the court announced the rule that "there can be no
recovery in one state for injuries to the person sustained in another,
unless the infliction of the injuries is actionable under the law of the
state in which they were received.
4 4
41. Id. at 803-05.
42. See id. at 805 (indicating that, because neither party offered any evidence of
Mississippi law, the court presumed it to be the same as Alabama's common law,
which did not recognize liability for fellow-servant injuries).
43. For a successful example of an argument that the law of the place of the
negligent act should govern, see, e.g., Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479
(10th Cir. 1950) (ruling that the law of the site of negligent aircraft repair governed).
See also WE1NTRAUB, supra note 3, at 346 n.2 (listing other cases). This solution may
be what Justice Blackmun had in mind in his Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner
concurrence, in which he pointed out that the Supreme Court's per curiam instruction
to apply the Texas choice-of-law rule on remand did not necessarily lead to
Cambodian law; instead, it could result in the application of the law of Texas, where
the malfunctioning ammunition was manufactured. 423 U.S. 3, 4 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). On the other hand, Blackmun may have been anticipating the change in
the Texas choice-of-law rule that came four years later in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583
S.W.2d 312, 312 (Tex. 1979).
44. Carroll, 11 So. at 807. In its supporting reasoning, the court offered a classic
statement of the vested-rights theory:
Up to the time this train passed out of Alabama no injury had resulted. For
all that occurred in Alabama, therefore, no cause of action whatever arose.
The fact which created the right to sue, the injury, without which confessedly
no action would lie anywhere, transpired in the state of Mississippi. It was
in that state, therefore, necessarily that the cause of action, if any, arose; and
whether a cause of action arose and existed at all, or not, must in all reason
be determined by the law which obtained at the time and place when and
where the fact which is relied on to justify a recovery transpired. Section
2590 of the Code of Alabama had no efficacy beyond the lines of Alabama.
It cannot be allowed to operate upon facts occurring in another state, so as to
evolve out of them rights and liabilities which do not exist under the law of
that state . . . Where the facts occur in Alabama, and a liability
becomes fixed in Alabama, it may be enforced in another state having like
enactments, or whose policy is not opposed to the spirit of such enactments;
but this is quite a different matter .... The negligent infliction of an injury
here, under statutory circumstances, creates a right of action here, which,
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Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll-rendered
several years before the First Restatement but consistent with its
rules-is a popular example of how unfair and absurd the vested-rights
doctrine could be. This is not to suggest that all applications of the
vested-rights doctrine produced bad results. Many cases were resolved
with logical and predictable results.45 But in certain fact patterns-
such as when all parties were from one state, and the injury occurred in
a second state-the vested-rights doctrine often yielded bad results.
California offers another example in 195 8,just on the eve of the
mid-century conflicts revolution. Plaintiff Rudolph Victor had ridden
into Mexico-about twenty-six miles south of Tijuana-as the
passenger of another California resident.46 Their car collided with one
driven by another Californian, John C. Sperry, and owned by yet
another Californian, John M. Sperry (John C.'s father).47 Victor was a
house mover earning $99 a week, but he had suffered spinal-cord
damage and could no longer work.48 Using California's lex locus rule,
the trial court applied Mexico's lost-wage rule of $2.00 a day.49 The
court rejected the only part of Mexican law that favored plaintiff, strict
liability against the other car's owner, because it violated California
being transitory, may be enforced in any other state or country the comity of
which admits of it; but for an injury inflicted elsewhere than in Alabama our
statute gives no right of recovery, and the aggrieved party must look to the
local law to ascertain what his rights are. Under that law this plaintiff had no
cause of action, as we have seen, and hence he has no rights which our
courts can enforce, unless it be upon a consideration to be presently adverted
to.
Id. at 806-07. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that, because his
employment contract with the railroad was made in Alabama between an Alabama
citizen and an Alabama company, the Alabama workers' compensation act became
part of the contract, and its benefits applied to injuries suffered in other states. Id. at
807-09.
45. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1878) (upholding validity of
a married woman's guaranty for her husband's debts because the law of the place of
contracting determines contractual capacity). See also infra note 202. A better
example of the First Restatement's occasional accuracy is the Second Restatement's
incorporation of lex locus elements as the presumptive choice of law. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971) (providing that, for
personal injuries, the law of the place of injury controls unless the law of another state
has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties).
46. Victor v. Sperry, 329 P.2d 728, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 730.
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public policy. 50 The California Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.
51
It could be argued that in spite of the injustice of Victor's being
compensated under Mexico's relatively low daily-wage calculations,
this decision is more understandable than Carroll. Carroll involved
negligence in Alabama with a Mississippi injury, while in Victor, the
negligence and the injury both occurred in Mexico-perhaps plaintiff
Victor had no right to expect anything other than a Mexican remedy.
But there is more to Victor v. Sperry. Professor Weintraub points out
that both California and Mexico would hold the senior Sperry liable as
the car's owner.52 Thus, lex locus reached a result that would not be
reached under either state's law.
In both Carroll and Victor, all parties were from State A, the
injury occurred in State B, and the injured plaintiff sued in the home
forum, State A. Vested-rights analysis often produced unfair results in
this setting, and Texas had its share of these decisions. Gutierrez v.
Collins53 is one of the best, but by no means the only, example.
Esperanza Gutierrez lived in El Paso, Texas and was injured in
Zaragosa, Mexico when the car in which she was riding was struck by a
car driven by another El Paso resident, Edward Collins.54 Gutierrez
sued Collins in a state court in El Paso, and because Texas used lex
locus rules, she provided ample evidence of her right to recover under
the pertinent laws of both Mexico and the state of Chihuahua.55 The
trial court dismissed Gutierrez's claim because of the dissimilarity
doctrine, in spite of Gutierrez's having demonstrated the arguable
equivalence of Mexican remedies.56 The El Paso Court of Appeals
affirmed, but it carefully recited Gutierrez's ample proof of her right to
recover and expressed regret at not having the power to adopt a new
choice-of-law test that would give a remedy "in particular to this
50. Id.
51. Victor, 329 P.2d at 733 (noting that the appellant's petition for a hearing by
the California Supreme Court was denied Nov. 5, 1958).
52. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 364.
53. 570 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978), rev'd, 583 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. 1979).
54. Id. at 102.
55. Id.
56. For example, plaintiff Gutierrez proved the content of Mexican federal law
on the issue of compensation for lost wages (including the means of computation), as
well as the law of Chihuahua on her entitlement to moral reparations as an equivalent
to damages for pain and suffering. Id. For a definition of the dissimilarity doctrine,
see supra note 33.
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Plaintiff who otherwise will probably be without any relief."
57
This fact pattern-plaintiff and defendant from one state, injury
in another-occurred in other settings, such as guest-host immunity.
58
Another problematic variation was where the wrong and the injury
were in different states, regardless of the parties' residency. This
variation included claims for loss of consortium where the place of the
wrong differed from the place where the loss was suffered, 59 and dram-
shop cases, where the defendant-tavern owner sold the liquor in one
state, and the accident occurred in another. Tort claims with
nonphysical injuries presented problems in locating the place of the
harm; these included claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, unfair
competition, and fraud.6'
Contracts had similar problems under the First Restatement,
62
and based on Milliken v. Pratt,63 the most celebrated problem was
64married women's contracts. A more thorough criticism of Beale's
57. Gutierrez, 570 S.W.2d at 103.
58. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 693-94 (stating that the law of the place of the
accident traditionally controlled despite parties' place of residence).
59. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 692-93 (arguing that the difficulty of loss-of-
consortium claims arises from confusion over whether the place of wrong will be
considered the site of the accident or the domicile, i.e., the place where the consortium
or companionship was lost).
60. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 693 (describing the analysis of dram-shop-act
cases where courts select the site of the accident for choice of law).
61. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 695 (criticizing the traditional rule for confusion
caused by these types of torts, despite its ease of application).
62. In his treatise devoted to attacking the First Restatement, Professor Cook
spent ninety-five pages discussing problems with Beale's approach to contract choice
of law but only thirty-five pages attacking torts. In his chapter on contract formation,
Cook concluded that Beale's place-of-making rule: (1) could "not be derived from a
logical application of its alleged 'territorial' basis;" (2) was therefore not the coherent
and logical theory it purported to be; (3) was inconsistent with judicial practice; (4)
became consistent only when the territorial or vested-rights theory was abandoned; (5)
did not offer a great degree of certainty; and (6) led to artificial and arbitrary results.
WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 387-88 (1942).
63. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
64. Mrs. Pratt, a Massachusetts resident along with her husband, guaranteed her
husband's account up to $500 with Deering, Milliken & Co., a store in Portland,
Maine. Id. at 374. Mr. Pratt obtained goods there from time to time and eventually
defaulted, leaving a $560.12 debt. Id. at 375. Milliken sued Mrs. Pratt in
Massachusetts on her $500 guarantee, which faced the conflicts problem of
Massachusetts's deeming married women lacking in contractual capacity; Maine
would honor the contract. Id. at 376-77. Mrs. Pratt had executed the agreement in
Massachusetts, and her husband mailed it to Maine. Id. at 374. The Massachusetts
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contracts rules is his rejection ofPritchard v. Norton's party-validation
rule, under which "a contract is governed by the law with a view to
which it was made." 65 This contract-validating view, quite consistent
with the Second Restatement's policy of upholding contracting parties'
expectations, 66 had Beale's disapproval because it "involves permission
to the parties to do a legislative act. It practically makes a legislative
body of any two persons who choose to get together and contract."
67
Contract law may be the best evidence of the extent of Beale's
mechanistic jurisprudence; although the criticism carried through torts,
property, family law, and other subjects.68
Skeptics may look at these examples and point out, quite
correctly, that all choice-of-law approaches are capable of bad results in
some cases, either because of unanticipated consequences or the court's
poor application of the choice-of-law test. If that were the only
criticism of vested rights, it would not have incurred the wrath that it
did. The vested-rights tests produced not just occasional bad results but
also patterns of bad results. Moreover, because of bad results in certain
categories of cases, courts increasingly manipulated the tests to achieve
Supreme Court held that Maine law applied under a place-of-making rule, which
upheld the contract. Pratt, 125 Mass. at 382. This may seem quite correct, but the
case has been rigorously criticized. See, e.g., GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS 227-28 (1951) (doubting applicability of Maine statute);
WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 440-44 (noting that the place-of-making rule is open to
question); Ernest Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws
(pts. 1-3), 30 YALE L.J. 565, 30 YALE L.J. 655, 31 YALE L.J. 53 (1921) (criticizing, in
a three-part article, the confusion caused by unequal application of choice of law by
the courts in contract cases); Walter W. Cook, "Contracts " and the Conflict ofLaws,
31 U. ILL. L. REv. 143, 170-71 (1936) (observing inconsistency between conflict-of-
laws rules and judicial decisions). One criticism is that a Maine court may well have
applied Massachusetts law and invalidated the contract, a fact the court did not
consider. See STUMBERG, supra note 64, at 227 & n. 14. While subject to general
criticism from others, the issue of married women's contracts was the beachhead for
Currie's attack on the First Restatement. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's
Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Methods, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227 (1958)
(isolating the problem with Milliken v. Pratt as revealing broader problems with
choice-of-law doctrine).
65. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 136 (1882).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6 cmts. c & g, 188
cmt. b (1971).
67. Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 260 (1909), discussed in RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 189.
68. For an objective but comprehensive discussion of Beale, see SCOLES, supra
note 3, at 18-79 (characterizing the shift from "comity" to "vested rights" and beyond
as a "scholastic revolution").
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results deemed fair, or at least acceptable. 69 This manipulation, of
course, began to erode lex locus's greatest strength-predictability.
And although it may be true that most cases fared well under lex locus,
and it may also be true that all choice-of-law approaches have
problems, the perception grew that a lex locus and vested-rights
approach was a very bad way to choose the governing law.
70
With those problems in mind, in 1953 the American Law
Institute undertook a review of the First Restatement's rules with the
idea, at first, of modifying its mechanistic approach. That effort-the
beginning of the Second Restatement-might have produced nothing
more than substantial changes in the rules-oriented First Restatement,
except for two earlier movements that picked up speed in the early
69. The vested-rights method had at least six escape devices. One is to
recharacterize a claim, for example from tort to contract. E.g., Hudson v. Cont'l Bus
Sys., Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ ref d
n.r.e.) (deciding a case where an action for damages from an automobile accident
raised contractual issues between the bus company and passenger). A second and
related escape device is to recharacterize a substantive issue as procedural. E.g., Paine
v. Moore, 464 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, no writ) (finding that
the statute of frauds is evidentiary, and therefore, procedural). Renvoi, or the use of
the other state's choice-of-law rule to reach a different result is a third escape device.
E.g., Univ. of Chicago v. Dater, 270 N.W. 175 (1936) (concerning a controversy over
whether Michigan or Illinois law applied because the results varied depending on
which rules governed); see also Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817
S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1991) (explaining that Texas courts apparently did not have
occasion to consider renvoi under the First Restatement, and have rejected it thus far
under the Second Restatement). A fourth escape device is d~peqage, or the
application of different laws to different issues in a lawsuit. E.g, Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,421 (Tex. 1984) (discussing which state law to apply in
a contract action). A fifth device is the application of forum public policy to reject an
otherwise applicable foreign law. E.g., Griffin v. McCoach, 116 F.2d 261, 264 (5th
Cir. 1940) (considering public policy grounds in reaching the outcome), rev'd, 313
U.S. 498 (1941). A sixth escape device is relying on the forum's lack of familiarity
with the foreign law. E.g., Mex. Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Slater, 115 F. 593 (5th Cir. 1902),
aff'd, 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (stating that the court could not enforce the laws of Mexico
because they were too different from Texas law); see also supra note 33; infra note
201. See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 184-86, 191-92
(discussing a range of mechanisms for escaping the law of the place of injury);
SCOLES, supra note 3, at 119-45 (examining pervasive problems with choice of law
and how they are handled); WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 375-82 (analyzing the
recharacterization methods).
70. See supra notes 64 & 69. See generally SCOLES, supra note 3, at 22-25
("Although highly influential in the courts until the late 1950s, the vested-rights
theory was subject to severe criticism in the literature even at the time of the debates
on the formulation of the First Restatement.").
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1950s and came of force by the end of that decade. One movement
took place in the courts, led by New York Chief Judge Stanley Fuld
7 1
and joined by formidable judicial talent in Minnesota,72 California,73
Oregon,74 and other states.75 The other movement occurred in books
and law-review articles by conflicts scholars such as Cook,76 Cavers,77
Stumberg, 78 Ehrenzweig,79 and later Cheatham,80 Reese, 81 Leflar,82 von
83 84Mehren, Trautman, and, clearly the most influential at the time,
71. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (discussing, through
Judge Feld's opinion, the merits of the "center of gravity" or the "grouping of
contracts" theory of the conflict of laws, under which the courts emphasize the law of
the place "which has the most significant contacts" with the matter of the dispute);
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). Babcock is seen as a hallmark in
the turn away from lex locus rules. But fourteen years earlier, a federal district court
in Massachusetts had balanced the forum's governmental interests against
Pennsylvania's in a husband's action against a third party for intentionally inducing
loss of consortium. See Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D. Mass. 1949),
aff'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) (holding that, in all matrimonial tort actions, "the
right to maintain a suit against a local defendant on account of local conduct turns on
the matrimonial domicile of the plaintiff').
72. See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1957)
(determining the conflicts-of-law issue by balancing the state's interests, rather than
by using the Restatement).
73. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal. 1953) (determining that,
because all of the parties to the case were residents of California, and because the
estate of the decedent was being administered in California, the plaintiffs' right to
prosecute their cause of action was governed by California law relating to the
administration of estates).
74. See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 551 (Or. 1964) (applying choice-
of-law rules that were based on public policy).
75. See generally SCOLES, supra note 3, at 68-79.
76. See generally COOK, supra note 62, passim.
77. See generally, e.g., David Cavers, A Critique of the Choice ofLaw Problem,
47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933).
78. See generally, e.g., STUMBERG, supra note 64.
79. See generally, e.g., ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1967); Albert Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A Restatement of the
Lex Fori Approach, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965).
80. See generally Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the
Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1952).
81. See generally id.
82. See generally, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (4th ed.
1986).
83. See generally, e.g., ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965).
84. See generally, e.g., id.
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Brainerd Currie.85 With attacks on both judicial and academic fronts,
Beale and the First Restatement were targets of voluminous, often
harsh criticism from reformers who could not agree on a solution and
were themselves accused of an inability to articulate a cogent choice-
of-law theory. 86 Even with this criticism, the lex locus system remains
in effect in ten states for contract claims and eleven for torts, 87 and it
still has its defenders.
88
2. Currie's Governmental-Interest Analysis
Brainerd Currie had the idea-a valid one-that the process of
choosing the governing law ought to have something to do with the
purpose behind that law. In fact, he believed that choice of law ought
to have everything to do with the law's purpose-an invalid idea. He
argued that consideration of territorial events, especially irrelevant
ones, should be replaced by a consideration of the pertinent laws'
purpose, and the extent to which a particular law could accomplish its
purpose in the instant case. This approach resulted in a choice-of-law
test that looked like the following, quoted from Currie's parody of the
Second Restatement project then underway:
If I were asked to restate the conflict of laws I would
decline the honor. A descriptive restatement with any
sort of internal consistency is impossible. Much of the
existing law, or psuedo law, of the subject is irrational;
profound changes destructive of the fundamental tenets
of the traditional system are gathering momentum. On
the assumption that the project admits of a statement of
what is reasonable in existing law and what may
reasonably be desired for the future, however, I
volunteer the following as a substitute for all that part of
85. See generally CURRIE, supra note 13.
86. A footnote is no place to list the conflicts theorists accused of this flaw. I am
not aware of any twentieth-century conflicts method that has not been roundly flayed
and rejected by multiple critics.
87. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 85.
88. One prominent First Restatement supporter is Judge Posner, who listed as
one of American law's miscarried twentieth-century legal reforms "the destruction of
certainty in the field of conflict of laws as a result of the replacement of the
mechanical common law rules by 'interest analysis."' RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 430 (1990).
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the Restatement dealing with choice of law (for the
purpose of finding a rule of decision): I
§ 1. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign
state different from the law of the forum, it should
inquire into the policies expressed in the respective
laws, and into the circumstances in which it is
reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest
in the application of those policies. In making these
determinations the court should employ the ordinary
processes of construction and interpretation.
§ 2. If the court finds that one state has an interest in
the application of its policy in the circumstances of the
case and the other has none, it should apply the law of
the only interested state.
§ 3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the
interests of the two states, it should reconsider. A more
moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or
interest of one state or the other may avoid conflict.
§ 4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a
conflict between the legitimate interests of the two
states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the
forum.
§ 5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable
conflict exists between the laws of the two other states,
and the court cannot with justice decline to adjudicate
the case, it should apply the law of the forum-until
someone comes along with a better idea.
§ 6. The conflict of interest between states will result in
different dispositions of the same problem, depending
on where the action is brought. If with respect to a
particular problem this appears seriously to infringe a
strong national interest in uniformity of decision, the
court should not attempt to improvise a solution
sacrificing the legitimate interest of its own state, but
should leave to Congress, exercising its powers under
the full faith and credit clause, the determination of
which interest shall be required to yield.
The explanatory note might run a little longer.89
89. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson: A Recent Development
in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1242-43 (1963).
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Bernhard v. Harrah's Club9" provides a good example of
interest analysis's judicial articulation, done here as a predicate to
California's adoption of the comparative-impairment test,91 a variant of
interest analysis. This paragraph, however, is limited to an explanation
of Currie's interest analysis:
The search for the proper resolution of a true conflicts
case, while proceeding within orthodox parameters of
governmental interest analysis, has generated much
scholarly examination and discussion. The father of the
governmental interest approach, Professor Brainerd
Currie, originally took the position that in a true
conflicts situation the law of the forum should always
be applied.... However, upon further reflection, Currie
suggested that when under the governmental interest
approach a preliminary analysis reveals an apparent
conflict of interest upon the forum's assertion of its own
rule of decision, the forum should reexamine its policy
to determine if a more restrained interpretation of it is
more appropriate.92
Most opinions invoking interest analysis preface it with a much
briefer statement and often identify few specific steps, as illustrated in a
1996 New Jersey case identifying two interest analysis "prongs": (1)
"an inquiry into whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of
the respective states, 93 and (2) "identify the governmental policies
underlying the law of each state and how those policies are affected by
each state's contacts to the litigation and to the parties." 94 California
cases are similarly brief in describing their choice-of-law test;
95
90. 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1974).
91. The comparative-impairment test "proceeds on the principle that true
conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the state whose interest would be
the more impaired if its law were not applied." Id. at 723.
92. Id. at 722-23 (internal citation omitted).
93. Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 109 (1996) (citing Veazey v.
Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1986)).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Super. Ct., 522 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1974) (discussing
the state's interests and underlying policies); Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Oil
Co., 583 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1978) (describing the proper application of choice-of-law
analysis in California).
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although federal courts applying the California test have been more
descriptive.96 This weakness is not limited to courts using Currie's
interest analysis; Texas courts purporting to apply the Second
Restatement's most-significant-relationship test have offered similarly
shallow descriptions of the process being applied.97 The difference is
that the Second Restatement offers multiple factors for courts wishing
to use them. Interest analysis does not.
In any event, with relatively early endorsements in California,
98
New Jersey,99 Oregon, 100 and Pennsylvania, 1 0 ' interest analysis began a
sweeping reform of American conflicts practice, shifting the
perspective from territoriality to an examination of the laws being
applied and their underlying purposes.'°2 There is no doubt that Currie
96. See, e.g., Liew v. Official Receiver & Liquidator, 685 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th
Cir. 1982) (examining the substantive law relating to both California and Singapore
jurisdictions); Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501,
1506-07 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing three steps: (1) examine the substantive law in the
pertinent states to determine if they differ; (2) if so, apply the law of the state that has
an interest; and (3) if more than one state has an interest, use the comparative
impairment approach and apply the law of the state with the most impaired interest).
97. See, e.g., Schneider Nat'l Transp. v. Ford Motor Co., 280 F.3d 532, 536 (5th
Cir. 2002) (discussing the state's interests in the conflict-of-law analysis); Fleetwood
Enters., Inc., v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding, without
elaboration, that under Texas choice-of-law rules, Texas law applies).
98. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967) (analyzing the interests
of all parties involved in the case to determine the applicable law).
99. See Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625,627 (N.J. 1967) (finding that "the State
of Ohio has a real interest in having its rules of the road apply to the conduct of the
parties in the operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of that state").
100. See Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494, 496 (Or. 1973) (stating that when "in
the particular factual context, the interests and policies of one state are involved and
those of the other are not ... reason would seem to dictate that the law of the state
whose policies and interests are vitally involved should apply").
101. See Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 806-07 (Pa. 1964)
(holding that Pennsylvania law of damages was applicable, despite the fact that the
accident took place in Colorado, because Colorado has no interest in the compensation
of those rendering medical aid and assistance when death is immediate).
102. Professor Juenger noted that "Currie's postulates met with remarkable
success among academicians.... Even academicians who quarrel with Currie beyond
matters of detail accept some of his fundamental precepts, such as the division of
choice of law problems into true and false conflicts." Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of
Laws: A Critique ofInterest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMp. L. 1, 13 (1984) (citing David
F. Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131 REC. DES
COURs 73, 153 (1970)). Juenger further noted Currie's enormous caselaw impact:
"Currie's ideas have also found their way into countless judicial opinions. Indeed, it
has been asserted that 'Currie's approach is, in fact, usually applied today by courts
committed to a policy-centered view of choice of law, even when they are purporting
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exposed not just flaws, but voids in the vested-rights system. Foremost
among them was his point that the law's underlying purpose matters.
0 3
Even when applying local law, courts refuse to apply a statute whose
purpose will not be realized; it follows that courts should reject foreign
laws in similar circumstances. This notion works well in cases in
which the laws' purposes are obvious, but it can fail when the purposes
are obscure. Noting the difficulty of ascertaining governmental
interests, New York's Judge Breitel stated: "Intramural speculation on
the policies of other states has obvious limitations because of restricted
information and wisdom. It is difficult enough to interpret the statutes
and decisional rules of one's own state."
104
Breitel was one of Currie's kinder critics, and Friedrich Juenger
was perhaps the fiercest. Juenger wrote a critique of interest analysis in
1984 that included definitive compilations of judicial and scholarly
criticism. 10 5 The list is impressive and included the majority of the
mid-to-late twentieth century's leading conflicts scholars: Hill,'0 6
Kom,'10 7 Leflar, 108 von Mehren,' ° Reese," l Rosenberg,"' Sedler,"l
to apply a different approach."' Id. at 14 (citing Robert A. Sedler, The Government
Interest Approach to Choice ofLaw: An Analysis andReformation, 25 UCLA L. REV.
181, 181 (1977)). See also SCOLES, supra note 3, at 25-38 (discussing Currie's
governmental-interests analysis and its once-dominant role in choice-of-law teaching).
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411 (N.Y. 1969) (Breitel, J., dissenting).
105. See generally Juenger, supra note 102, at 8-50.
106. Juenger, supra note 102, at 30 n.184 (citing Alfred Hill, Governmental
Interests and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.
463, 486-502 (1960)).
107. Juenger, supra note 102, at 30 n.185 (citing Harold Kom, The Choice of
Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 777, 959 (1983)).
108. Juenger, supra note 102, at 30 nn.186-87 (citing ROBERT LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 186, 210-212 (3d ed. 1977)).
109. Juenger, supra note 102, at 31 n. 188 (citing Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent
Trends in Choice of Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 938-39 (1975)).
110. Juenger, supra note 102, at 30 n. 189 (citing Willis Reese, American Trends
in Private International Law: Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice ofLaw
Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND. L. REV. 717, 722 (1980)).
111. "Rosenberg quarrels with the assumption that one can discern some clear-
cut purpose behind each rule of law. He points out that many rules represent a
compromise among conflicting policies." Juenger, supra note 102, at 30 (citing
Maurice Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 464 (1967)).
112. "[W]hat has endeared [Currie's] doctrine to judges is its potential as a giant
escape device. Handled deftly, the mushy words 'policies' and 'interests' free courts
from the constraints of rules and consistency, permitting them to reach any conclusion
they choose. Interest analysts concede that 'where a court wants to apply its own
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Rheinstein, 3 Martin, 114 Silberman,"' Twerski," 16 Hay," 7 Yntema, "'
Ely, 119 Brilmayer,120 and Juenger himself.12 1 Juenger included judicial
law, it may 'manufacture' policies and interests."' Juenger, supra note 102, at 49
n.304 (quoting Robert Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice ofLaw:
An Analysis anda Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181,203 (1977)). In spite of this
critical comment, Sedler was a supporter of interest analysis. See generally, e.g.,
Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to
Choice ofLaw: An Appreciation anda Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865,865 n. 1
(1990).
113. "Rheinstein, a renowned comparatist, contended that it is practically
impossible to ascertain the policies of a foreign legal system. In international cases,
experts even disagree on what rules prevail abroad, let alone what policies underlie
such rules, and the decision of courts that trust their own impressions of foreign
policies would be 'aphoristic and unreliable."' Juenger, supra note 102, at 31
(quoting Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 663
(1962)).
114. Juenger, supra note 102, at 32 n.205 (citing James A. Martin, The
Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction, 10 HOFSTRAL. REv. 133, 147-48 (1981)).
115. Juenger, supra note 102, at 32 n.204 (citing Linda J. Silberman, Can the
State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice of Law Constraints After
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 109, 110 (1981)).
116. Juenger, supra note 102, at 32 n.208 (citing Aaron Twerski, On
Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 149, 168 (1981)).
117. Juenger, supra note 102, at 32 n.207 (citing Peter Hay, Full Faith and
Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REV. 709, 722, 727-29
(1981)).
118. "Yntema believed that 'autarchic assertions of national policy.., are not
germane' to conflicts law; and termed the proposal that conflicts should be decided by
a calculus of governmental interests, 'a vague and perverse idea, suggesting that laws
are made for bureaucracy."' Juenger, supra note 102, at 30 (citing Hest Yntema,
Basic Issues in Conflicts Law, 12 AM J. CoMP. L. 474, 482 (1963)).
119. Juenger, supra note 102, at 29 nn.172-74 (citing John Hart Ely, Choice of
Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173,
199-207 (1981)).
120. Juenger, supra note 102, at 29 n.169 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Interest
Analysis and the Myth ofLegislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 392 (1980)). See
also Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict ofLaws: A Challenge, 35
MERCER L. REV. 555, 555 (1984) ("I believe that interest analysis is methodologically
bankrupt, have said so in print, and have been criticized.... It is crucial to unmask
this fallacy.").
121. The following passages are but a few examples of Juenger's intense attack:
In fact, there is little to support the [government interest] analysts' belief in
the reality of such interests. To Currie it was an article of faith that
governments have an interest in rules of private law, and he viewed the
vindication of such interests as an important attribute of sovereignty.
However, as we have seen, judges as well as scholars have questioned their
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references as well, 122 but he missed Judge Posner's. Posner listed as
one of American law's miscarried twentieth-century legal reforms "the
destruction of certainty in the field of conflict of laws as a result of the
replacement of the mechanical common law rules by 'interest
analysis. ,,123
The Scoles treatise summarizes interest analysis's weaknesses:
the inadequacy and inherent bias in Currie's method of using nothing
more than domestic statutory construction and interpretation; the
difficulty of pinpointing the underlying policies; the difficulty of
delineating a law's intended territorial reach; the fallacy of states
existence. True, many judicial opinions, including those of the United States
Supreme Court, refer to state interests. But mere reiteration, even by the
highest tribunal, cannot fill an empty word with meaning. After all, rights
never really did vest, nor did obligations stalk hapless debtors, no matter
how often the courts resorted to these figures of speech.
Juenger, supra note 102, at 36.
Interest analysts ... actually believe in the reality of their approach and the
imaginary problems it creates; they talk about conflicts, true and false, and
unprovided-for cases as if these constructs had an existence independent of
the theoretical framework that created them. Thus, while Currie helped free
courts from the stranglehold of the vested rights doctrine, he forged new
metaphysical irons and many law professors wear them with pride. Such
intellectual bondage demands either self-deception or duplicity; it stifles
inquiry and impairs the integrity of our discipline.
Juenger, supra note 102, at 50.
I doubt that interest analysis, taken seriously, has much to offer courts called
upon to resolve problems posed by real-life interstate and international
transactions. That methodology produces an intolerable lack of certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result, which is the inexorable consequence
of an approach premised on empty imagery. The social cost of such an
approach is great: counsel may commit malpractice if they settle; run of the
mill traffic accidents must be litigated up to the highest state courts.
Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law: How It Ought Not to Be, 48 MERCER L. REV.
757, 760 (1997) [hereinafter Juenger, Choice of Law].
122. See Juenger, supra note 102, at 26-28 (referencing judicial discontent with
the uncertainties of interest analysis).
123. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 430 (1990). See
also Carter v. United States, 333 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2003) ("If Maryland followed
the maddeningly indefinite 'interest-balancing' approach to conflicts issues, it
conceivably might decide .... But Maryland does not follow such an approach: it
adheres to the old-fashioned conflicts principle of lex loci delicti .... ).
Summer 2004] 517
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
having an interest in private disputes; the inadequate concept of state
interests that failed to consider multistate interests and noncitizen
interests and that assumed state laws were not intended to apply to
foreigners; and the unconstitutionality and moral reprehensibility of
Currie's personal-law principle that states are interested only in their
own citizens. 124 These criticisms barely scratch the surface of the
numerous attacks on interest analysis.' 25 On the other hand, the method
still has ardent and articulate defenders. 126  Three states now use
governmental-interest analysis as an official choice-of-law rule for tort
cases; 127 federal common law uses it for certain federal choice-of-law
matters; 12 8 and the U.S. Supreme Court has mandated it for full-faith-
and-credit purposes. 129 Nonetheless, the interest-analysis vocabulary is
more widespread and, when used in its pure form, is inappropriate with
multifactored tests.
124. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 35-38.
125. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 33-34.
126. There are several current interest analysis defenders. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB,
supra note 3,passim; Herma Hill Kay, Currie's Interest Analysis in the 21st Century:
Losing the Battle But Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 123 (2001); Bruce
Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and its "New Crits, " 36 AM. J. COMP. L.
681 (1988); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice ofLaw, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1990).
127. See supra note 12 (stating that California, New Jersey, and the District of
Columbia currently use interest analysis as their common-law choice-of-law rule for
tort cases).
128. See Taylor v. Lloyds Underwriters, 972 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing Truehart v. Blandon, 884 F.2d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Transco
Exploration Co. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1989))). In
Taylor, the court explains that maritime issues not governed by an established rule
(here, punitive damages) are governed by state law. However, the state whose law
governs is selected not by the local state's choice-of-law rule, but by a federal
common law rule calling for "the state having the greatest interest in the resolution of
the issues." Id.
129. But see supra note 27 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent interpretation
of the full faith and credit clause). Even were the Court to pull back from Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495 (2003), and permit interest analysis to have a
continued constitutional role, it should not be seen as a Supreme Court endorsement of
Currie interest analysis. The full-faith-and-credit clause-addressing interstate
relations in a federal system-is well served by interest analysis. In fact, it is difficult
to think how else its purpose could be served other than by honoring state interests, to




3. The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
The American Law Institute approved the Second
Restatement's final draft in 1969, and it appeared in print in 1971.
Now used in twenty-four states for contract claims and in twenty-one
for torts,130 it is the most popular of the various theories currently used
in American jurisdictions. The Second Restatement is eclectic,
combining what its drafters believed to be the best of several choice-of-
law methodologies. It functions like a code-that is, for any given
problem, several Second Restatement sections are likely to apply. It
more closely resembles the Uniform Commercial Code; other
Restatements tend to pronounce fairly discrete rules of law.
Briefly described, the Second Restatement works through three
related functions, described here in the reverse order of their best
use.13 1 First is section 6-often identified per se with the most-
significant-relationship test-with two components. Section 6(1) gives
dispositive priority to the forum's statutory choice-of-law rules. If
none apply, section 6(2) lists seven nonexclusive policies that may
identify the state having the most significant relationship to the dispute:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
132
The second functional component is a set of three general
principles for torts, contracts, and property. The general principles for
torts and contracts list contacts "to be taken into account in applying
130. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 14.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
132. Id. § 6. Comments following section 6 explain each of these areas in detail.
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the principles of § 6."133 These contacts are territorial and reminiscent
of the First Restatement, except that they potentially point to different
jurisdictions in complicated cases. For example, the tort general
principle lists four contacts: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2)
the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. 1
34
The black-letter language following this list states that "[t]hese
contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue."'1 35 That is, the court has discretion to
analyze these territorial contacts on a case-by-case basis; although
precedents acquired over time will erode that discretion. The general
principle for property differs from those for torts and contracts in two
respects. First, it has no territorial contacts. Second, it allows for
renvoi-the application of another state's choice-of-law rule-in some
cases. 136
The Second Restatement's third functional component is a
number of sections focused on specific claims and issues. For torts,
these issues are further broken down into particular torts (for example,
personal injury,' 37 property damage,' fraud, 139 defamation, 140 and
others 4 1), and then into particular issues (for example, standard of
care, 142 legal causation, 143 duty or privilege to act, 144 imputed
negligence, 145 and others 46). Further tort sections address wrongful
133. Id. § 145.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222. Its lack of
territorial contacts is compensated for by the sections that follow, many of which have
dispositive or presumptive choice-of-law rules. For example, real-estate mortgages
are governed by "the law that would be applied by the courts of the situs." Id. § 228.
The validity and effect of a conveyance of a chattel, on the other hand, is
presumptively governed by the law of the chattel's situs. Id. § 244.
137. Id. § 146.
138. Id. § 147.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148.
140. Id. § 149.
141. Id. §§ 150-55.
142. Id. § 157.
143. Id. § 160.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 163.
145. Id. § 166.
146. Id. §§ 156-74.
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death 147 and workers compensation. 148 Apart from torts, contracts, and
property, the Second Restatement has further specific issues for
procedure, 149 trusts, 150 status, 15 1 agency and partnership,' 52 business
corporations, 153 and administration of estates. 154 Finally, the Second
Restatement also deals with personal jurisdiction
155 and judgments; 156
those sections have no direct bearing on choice of law. Texas state and
federal courts have applied or cited twenty-nine of these specific
sections since 1979.157
For most choice-of-law questions, more than one section will
apply. The confusion of multi-section analysis can be minimized with
the following approach. First, does the forum has a choice-of-law
statute on point? If so, it is applied pursuant to section 6(1). 158 Second,
is the choice-of-law question limited to a specific issue, such as the
coverage of a release in a tort claim (the Duncan issue159)? If so,
section 170, governing tort claim releases, applies, which points to
section 145 (the general tort principle), listing four territorial contacts
to be considered along with the policy factors in section 6. Other
specific issues are, of course, governed by other sections. Third, if the
governing law for an entire claim is at issue, does a specific Second
Restatement section address it, for example multistate defamation? If
so, section 150 applies, which creates a presumption that the law of the
plaintiff's domicile applies unless another state has a more significant
relationship under section 6. Fourth, if no specific sections governing
claims or issues apply, begin the analysis with one of the three general
principles for tort, contract, or property, as appropriate, and consider
those contacts along with the policy factors in section 6. Fifth, if the
claim is not one of tort, contract, or property, and also has no other
147. Id. §§ 175-80.
148. Id. §§ 181-85.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122-44.
150. Id. §§ 267-82.
151. Id. §§ 283-90.
152. Id. §§ 291-95.
153. Id. §§ 296-313.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 314-423.
155. Id. §§ 80-91.
156. Id. §§ 92-121.
157. See infra Appendix B (listing cases that have cited these sections of the
Second Restatement)).
158. Of course, the Texas legislature provides the ultimate authority for this and
not the Second Restatement. Any choice-of-law statute the legislature validly enacts
supercedes the Second Restatement or any other common-law choice-of-law test.
159. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
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specific section (such as business associations), then use section 6 to
choose the appropriate law.
Although the Second Restatement's application can be
confounding, numerous decisions have applied it very well, including
many arising in Texas. Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc.
is a superior example. The case involved a contractual-indemnity suit
arising from a personal-injury claim for a worker injured in a Kansas
oilfield operation. 161 Texas-based Moran contracted to drill the Kansas
well for Delaware corporation Diamond Shamrock, using a form
contract with a standard mutual-indemnity clause.' 62 Boydstun, an
Oklahoma resident working on the Kansas well, was injured and sued
Moran in a Kansas federal court.1 6 3 Moran then claimed indemnity
against Diamond Shamrock and its insurer, who also perfected their
indemnity claims against Moran.' 64 Boydstun won $2.7 million against
Moran, and the case settled.165 Diamond Shamrock then sued Moran in
a Texas state court, seeking an indemnity determination under Texas
160. E.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990);
Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1990); Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427
(5th Cir. 1982); Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.
1991); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990); Houston Cas.
Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 51 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Tex. 1999);
Perez v. Alcoa Fujikura, Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Nunez v. Hunter
Fan Co., 920 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Neo Sack, Ltd. v. Vinmar Impex, Inc.,
810 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Becker v. Computer Scis. Corp., 541 F. Supp. 694
(S.D. Tex. 1982); Sanchez ex rel. Estate of Galvan v. Brownsville Sports Ctr., Inc.,
51 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted); Bridas Corp. v.
Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied);
Wagner v. Hughes Wood Prods., Inc., 979 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998),
aff'd, 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000); In re Rhymer, 969 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1998, no pet.); CPS Int'l, Inc. v. Dresser Ind., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied); Osbom v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied); Ossorio v. Leon, 705 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, no writ). Of the remaining choice-of-law opinions decided since 1979,
the quality ranges from good to why-bother. As for the twenty-five opinions criticized
in this Article, some were very well reasoned even if they applied something other
than the Second Restatement. The identification of the above cases as good examples
is, of course, because they applied the Second Restatement in the manner advocated
here. Those who disagree might find them bad examples. Nonetheless, I believe it
obvious that the Second Restatement is meant to be used as an integrated whole rather
than applied randomly.
161. Maxus Exploration, 817 S.W.2d at 51-52.
162. Id. at 51.
163. Id. at 52.




law. 166 The trial and intermediate appellate courts applied Texas law
and upheld Diamond Shamrock's indemnity claim. 167 The Texas
Supreme Court affirmed, but under Kansas law.'
68
The court's choice-of-law analysis first considered the most
specific applicable section of the Second Restatement-section 173's
comment b, which takes contractual-indemnity claims away from the
tort rules and places them under the contract general principles in
sections 187 and 188.169 The contract had no choice-of-law clause, so
the court examined section 188's territorial contacts, pursuant to
section 188.170 The court then turned to another specific area-section
196, governing services contracts and creating a presumption that the
law of the state of performance will govern unless another state has a
more significant relationship to the parties and the transaction. 17' The
court then examined the facts and made a preliminary finding that
Kansas law should govern under section 196, because the contract was
performed almost entirely there. 172 Following through on the other end
of section 196's presumption, the court then examined whether some
other state had a more significant relationship. Carefully considering
all of section 6's seven policy factors, the court verified the section 196
presumption pointing to Kansas law. 173 Maxus Exploration is a model
Second Restatement application. Among its other strengths, Maxus
Exploration took the better path when offered a false conflict
opportunity-the court found that the pertinent Texas law was probably
not intended to have an extraterritorial effect. 174 The Texas Supreme
Court allowed the test to work as it should, through all components.
Maxus Exploration is also a good example of why the Texas choice-of-
law rule, through Duncan,175 should not be read as being limited to
166. Maxus Exploration, 817 S.W.2d at 51-52.
167. Id. at 52-53.
168. See id. at 54, 56. In spite of reaching the same conclusion under Texas and
Kansas law, the supreme court noted two true conflicts between those laws.
169. Id. at 53 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 173
cmt. b (1971)).
170. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 and that
section's five contacts: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of negotiation; (3)
the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter; and (5) the parties'
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business).
171. Maxus Exploration, 817 S.W.2d at 53-54 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 & cmt. c to note "several virtues" of section 196).
172. Id. at 54.
173. Id. at 57.
174. Id.
175. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
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section 6.
In spite of Maxus Exploration's clarity, Justice Hecht's skillful
use of the most-significant-relationship test is no better an argument for
the Second Restatement than Justice Traynor's persuasive use of
government-interest analysis in Reich v. Purcell.176 To be sure, the
Second Restatement has its flaws and its detractors, as summarized in
three current conflicts treatises.' 77 Professor Weintraub believes that
the Second Restatement's general principles sections for torts1 78 and
contracts 179 mislead judges and lawyers into territorial-contacts
counting without regard for the purpose of the laws that would be
applied. 80 He further objects to the Second Restatement's suggestion
that when the actor's conduct and the injury occur in the same state,
that state's law will usually apply. Weintraub believes that such a rule
is "contrary to a consequences-based analysis,"' and he points out that
"[t]he landmark cases departing from the place-of-the-wrong rule are
all cases in which the tortfeasor's conduct and the injury occurred in
176. 432 P.2d 727, 729-31 (Cal. 1967) (ruling in a personal-injury case that each
state's respective interest determines which law to apply).
177. See Albert Ehrenzweig, "The Most Significant Relationship" in the
Conflicts Law of Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 700 passim (1963); Robert A. Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of
the Restatement (Second): An Analysis anda Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 279passim
(1972); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice of Law Methodology, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 927, 963-64 (1975) (contending that the Second Restatement only
made conflict-of-law questions more difficult).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
179. Id. § 188.
180. Weintraub argues that section 145
[a]ppears to envision a method of conflicts analysis that focuses on the
policies underlying putatively conflicting tort rules[, b]ut the list of 'contacts
to be taken into account' is antithetical to such an analysis. Whether or not a
particular contact with a state is significant for conflicts purposes cannot be
known until one first knows exactly what domestic tort rules are in conflict
and what the policies underlying those rules are. Only then can one
intelligently 'evaluate' rather than mechanically count the contacts.... The
Restatement [Second] formulation, although probably consistent with an
interest analysis, has mislead courts and lawyers on this most basic element
of that analysis ....
WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 357-58. He argues the same for contracts section 188,
seeing a "grave danger that section 188 will be interpreted to direct the counting of
physical contacts with the parties and with the transaction and the awarding of the
palm to the state with the 'most' contacts." WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 460.
181. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 358.
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the same state, but nevertheless the court discerned that it made no
sense whatever to apply the tort law of that state."' 18 2 Weintraub
believes that the Second Restatement is confusing to judges and
lawyers with too little time to scrutinize it "in all its detailed
commentary on the black letter."' 183 Further he believes that it is
inconsistent with functional analysis to list any contact as significant a
priori, and even more inconsistent to create a presumption that if the
place of negotiation and the place of performance coincide, this state's
law usually will govern.1
84
Although Richman's and Reynolds's treatise endorses the
Second Restatement,' 85 it summarizes the complaints against it,
including judicial ineptitude in its application,' 86 misleading language
in the comments, 187 and judicial failure to apply the topic-specific
sections.188 Richman and Reynolds report that the initial reaction to the
Second Restatement was "almost completely negative, criticizing the
document as 'too much of a compromise among conflicting
philosophies, too vague, exceedingly elastic, unpredictable,
directionless, and rudderless,"' but that recent scholarly assessment has
been more measured, and the real success has been in the courts, where
it has become the "dominant choice-of-law methodology in the United
States today.'
189
182. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 358-59 (referring to Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, 82 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1957), Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y.
1963), and other cases).
183. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 460.
184. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 460. Weintraub notes that "[t]his confusion,
with its hallmark of Ouija Board manipulation of physical contacts without advertence
to the domestic laws in putative conflict or to their underlying purposes, can be
illustrated by two cases cited in the Reporter's Notes to section 188." WEINTRAUB,
supra note 3, at 461 (leading into an analysis of Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y.
1954) and Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 425 P.2d 623 (Wash.
1967)).
185. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 238 (stating that the Second
Restatement has provided the dominant choice-of-law methodology in the United
States today).
186. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 214-15.
187. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 215 (noting that a frequently
quoted example is a hypothetical in the comments to section 146 that has created the
impression "that they should override the place of the injury rule only in cases where
the parties stray unintentionally there") (citing Weintraub, Hippocratic Standard,
supra note 3, at 1290).
188. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 216 (citing a study discussed in
Borchers, supra note 7, at 1240-46).
189. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 238 (quoting and citing
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Richman and Reynolds also point out that state adoption
statistics do not tell the entire story. First, the Second Restatement is
more pervasive than the official adoption numbers indicate, used as a
reference by many federal courts and by some states that formally
follow other methods. 90 But on the down side of the calculation, states
using the Second Restatement do not necessarily employ the same
methods, some using it for contacts counting, some for territorial
preferences, and some for interest balancing. 191 Richman and Reynolds
conclude that "there is a town-gown split" on the Second Restatement,
but that its influence is such that "it will form the jumping-off place for
any Third Restatement, or indeed any future choice of law reform with
a serious chance of success.''
19 2
The Scoles treatise offers praise for the Second Restatement but
acknowledges that "[iut is a judicial task of some magnitude to define
the place of the most significant relationship in light of [section] 6 and
the connecting factors, or to weigh factors for their 'relative'
significance."' 193 The Scoles authors note further problems: (1) that
"relative significance" must be determined on an issue-by-issue basis,
thus multiplying the law-fact patterns;' 94 (2) that all Second
Restatement illustrations are drafted from the perspective of a neutral
forum; yet very few cases arise in a neutral forum; thus making it more
Symeonides, JudicialAcceptance, supra note 3, at 1249-50 and sources cited therein).
190. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 214 n.3.
191. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 239. Texas has numerous
examples of choice of law based on contact counting, in spite of Duncan's contrary
instruction to look at quality, not quantity. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984). See, e.g., Thomas v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 994
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1993); Coakes v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.
1987); Barnes v. Forest Hills Inv., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. Tex. 1998);
SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Tex. 1996), affd,
133 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 1998); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 888 F.
Supp. 1372 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996); Chevalier v. Animal
Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1993); Hines v. Tenneco Chems.,
Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 36 S.W.3d 511
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part and remanded, 46 S.W.3d
829 (Tex. 2000); GXG, Inc. v. Texacal Oil & Gas Co., 977 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied); Smith v. Foodmaker, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ); Ramirez v. Lagunes, 794 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); State Nat'l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
192. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 238.
193. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 65.
194. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 65-66.
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likely that various sections will overly favor forum law; 195 and (3) that
the Second Restatement suffers from lack of predictability.' 96 The
Scoles treatise finds, however, that these problems are being
ameliorated by developing case law.'
9 7
With its acknowledged shortcomings, the Second Restatement
is a workable system that offers flexibility for the variety of fact
patterns and the nuances between similar cases that present themselves
in American courts. It considers governmental interests along with
those of the parties, the forum, and the national need for certainty,
predictability, and uniformity. More importantly for now, it is the
choice-of-law rule in Texas.
B. Choice of Law in Texas
Texas courts began applying other states' laws under Story's
system during the Republic,' 98 and, later, in the well-known Slater v.
Mexican National Railroad Co., which received Justice Holmes's
blessing. 199 From 1841 to Duncan s200 full adoption of the most-
195. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 66.
196. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 67. Scoles attributes this to the Second
Restatement's flexible structure, which depends on later litigation to produce
precedents rather than suggesting a priori rules; because most law practice is in the
form of legal advice prior to litigation, conflicts advice is difficult to give from the
Second Restatement. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 67.
197. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 67.
198. The first reported case is Hill v. McDermott, a suit to recover secured
collateral alleged to have been taken forcibly from the plaintiffs wife. Dallam 419
(Tex. 1841). The court ended up applying Texas law because the plaintiff failed to
prove the content of Georgia law. Id. at 422. The secured property was two slaves, a
mother and a child. Id. at 419. See also supra note 30 (distinguishing between real
statutes that operated locally and personal statutes that had extraterritorial effect);
Huff v. Folger, Lamb & Co., Dallam 530 (1843) (denying interest in suit on
promissory note because plaintiff failed to prove entitlement under New York law,
where the contract was made).
199. 194 U.S. 120 (1904). Laredo resident Slater died in Laredo from injuries
suffered on the job in nearby Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. The Fifth Circuit reversed a
federal trial-court verdict for Slater's widow on the grounds that the Mexican remedy
was too dissimilar because it arose under Mexico's penal law and required adjustable
periodic payments, rather than a lump sum judgment. Mex. Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Slater,
115 F. 593, 610 (5th Cir. 1902). Writing the Supreme Court's affirmance, Holmes
offered a classic statement of the vested-rights doctrine:
When such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the
wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is
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significant-relationship test in 1984, Texas courts applied Story's
comity and then Beale's vested-rights theories-both using the
territorial lex locus test-to over two hundred cases.20 1 Although many
were justly resolved, Texas litigants also experienced the lex locus
malfunctions discussed earlier in the American historical account,
20 2
from Slater in 1904 up through Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.,
2 03
Gutierrez v. Collins,2 04 and Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,20 5 discussed
below.
Texas judges had negative reactions to the First Restatement's
rigidity, similar to those of judges in other states, and were clearly
influenced by judicial and scholarly movements.20 6 This influence
resulted in early deviations from lex locus to experiments with Currie's
interest analysis and the emerging drafts of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, as well as discussions of other tests such as New
York's center-of-gravity approach. These judicial experiments in
Texas prior to Gutierrez and Duncan show an almost even split
between interest analysis (five cases) and the Second Restatement (six
cases), beginning in 1968. Five Texas cases-two state and three
federal-invoked interest analysis as preferable to Texas's long-
standing use of the First Restatement. Both state-court cases were from
subject to the lexfori, with regard to either its quality or its consequences.
On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act
is operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that,
although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the
forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other
obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person
may be found.
Slater, 194 U.S. at 126. In spite of this endorsement of transitory actions, the Court
upheld the Fifth Circuit's dismissal on dissimilarity grounds. Id. at 129.
200. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
201. Case list on file with the author.
202. See supra notes 38-68 and accompanying text. Between Hill v. McDermott,
Dallam 419 (1841), and Duncan in 1984, Texas courts issued well over two hundred
choice-of-law opinions applying lex locus and later, vested-rights principles. A
significant majority of these opinions reached results supportable under modem
theories. A list is on file with the author.
203. 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1986).
204. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
205. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
206. The scholarly movements included Texas writers, most notably George
Stumberg, who promoted Cook's "principles of expediency," and later, Russell
Weintraub, who defends interest analysis but proposes a broader inquiry. STUMBERG,
supra note 64, at 14-17; WE1NTRAUB, supra note 3, passim.
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the supreme court, one a dissent, 207 and one a majority opinion. 208 The
Southern District of Texas accounted for all three federal cases.20 9 Six
Texas cases--one supreme court dissent and five federal rulings21 0-
invoked or referred to the Second Restatement prior to its adoption in
Gutierrez.2 11  The supreme court dissent was Justice Steakley's
Marmon dissent, discussed above, in which he urged the court to adopt
a new choice of law test and promoted the Second Restatement as a
possibility.212
After equal attention to the Second Restatement and Currie's
207. The court in Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc. applied Colorado's $25,000
cap for wrongful-death claims in a case resulting from a Colorado air crash killing the
pilot and several Dallas businessmen. 430 S.W.2d at 184-85. The flight was from
Montana to Dallas, and the Colorado crash site was arguably fortuitous, resulting in
Justice Steakley's dissenting argument that Colorado had no interest in the accident.
Id. at 189-92 (Steakley, J., dissenting).
208. The court in Continental Oil Co. v. Lane Wood& Co., applied Texas law to
a dishonored check suit, using a lex locus analysis but including the finding that
"Oklahoma's connection with the transaction is minimal and fortuitous and it has no
interest in the present controversy." 443 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1969).
209. Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897, 905 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (applying
Texas law to plaintiff's personal-injury action arising in Libya, holding that "it would
seem more appropriate to apply Texas law, which this court will do, thereby adopting
the interest analysis test in this thorny field of conflicts of law"); Lipschutz v. Gordon
Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375, 385 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (applying New York law to
action for lost goods, and using interest analysis and the Second Restatement to
reinforce its lex locus choice); Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 81
(5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), on remand, 546 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1977)
(applying Texas law to personal-injury and wrongful-death claims by U.S. soldiers for
a malfunctioning artillery round that exploded prematurely in Cambodia; the Supreme
Court reversed because the lower courts used interest analysis and ignored Texas's
then-current lex locus rule).
210. Diaz v. Southeastern Drilling Co. of Arg., S.A., 324 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D.
Tex. 1969) (using the Second Restatement to support a lex locus decision to apply
Texas law to an action for accounting relating to oil drilling in Argentina); Dailey v.
Transitron Elec. Corp., 475 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law in a
wrongful-discharge claim with facts connected to five jurisdictions); Lipschutz, 373
F. Supp. at 384-85 (using both interest analysis and the Second Restatement to
reinforce a lex locus decision); Cont'l Oil Co. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F.
Supp. 288, 295-96 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (speculating that Texas would ignore its lex locus
test as unworkable in this commercial dispute regarding forty-six malfunctioning
railroad cars, and instead using the Second Restatement). See also Assoc. Press v.
Berger, 460 F. Supp. 1003, 1005-06 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (applying Second Restatement
sections 6 and 188 to reinforce lex locus choice of New York law in breach-of-
contract case).
211. 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Tex. 1979).
212. Marmon, 430 S.W.2d at 188-93 (Steakley, J., dissenting).
Summer 2004] 529
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
governmental-interest analysis, the Texas Supreme Court chose the
former. The opportune facts arose in Gutierrez v. Collins-a car crash
in Mexico between two Texas residents. As then required in Texas, the
trial court dismissed under the dissimilarity doctrine, and the court of
appeals affirmed.213 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, adopting the
Second Restatement's most-significant-relationship test for tort cases
214
and disavowing the dissimilarity doctrine.215 The supreme court did
not adopt the Second Restatement in its entirety, even for limited
application to tort claims. Rather, it specified sections 6 and 145 as
providing the guiding elements and policy considerations, and
remanded to the trial court for additional fact-finding relevant to the
new analytical factors.
216
In Robertson v. Estate ofMcKnight 17 the Texas Supreme Court
again adopted a single Second Restatement tort rule. The action arose
from a Texas airplane crash in which New Mexico residents Byron and
Amelda McKnight were killed, allegedly because of Mr. McKnight's
piloting error.218 Building on its Gutierrez precedent, the Texas
Supreme Court held that section 169 of the Second Restatement
governed interspousal tort immunity, rather than lex locus delicti, thus
applying New Mexico law and permitting the wife's estate's claim to
go to trial.219
The next step came in Duncan, where the Texas Supreme Court
extended Gutierrez's partial adoption of the Second Restatement to all
choice-of-law matters not governed by statute or contract.220 That
extension, however, was problematic. In its move to a modem choice-
of-law analysis, the Texas Supreme Court blended two distinct choice-
of-law approaches and produced an inappropriate hybrid. As the table
in the following section demonstrates, this erroneous hybrid has
resulted in state and federal courts applying aspects of a Currie interest
analysis in twenty-one percent of the choice-of-law cases decided since
1979. Although this hybrid functions well enough to produce plausible
213. Gutierrez v. Collins, 570 S.W.2d 101, 101-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1978), rev'd, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
214. Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318.
215. Id. at 319-22.
216. Id. at 319.
217. 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980).
218. Id. at 535.
219. Id. at 536-37. Texas law barred spousal negligence claims; New Mexico
law did not. Id. at 535-36.
220. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984). See infra
Part IV.A. L.a (describing Duncan in detail).
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results in most cases, it produces short-circuited analysis in some, and it
also holds the possibility of significant unfairness in a few cases.
Moreover, the hybrid calls for a near-impossible assessment of implicit
legislative intent in cases where speculation is the only means of
discerning that intent.
IV. POST-GUTIERREZ MISUSE OF INTEREST ANALYSIS IN TEXAS
Since the Texas Supreme Court's Gutierrez decision in 1979,
courts have applied the most-significant-relationship test to Texas
conflicts 119 times in civil cases. This number includes all pertinent
cases from the Texas Supreme Court (nine), Texas intermediate courts
of appeals (forty-one), federal district courts in Texas (thirty-four), and
Fifth Circuit decisions appealed from Texas federal courts (thirty-five).
The 119 cases were drawn from 288 Texas choice-of-law decisions
rendered since 1979, eliminating decisions that were limited to:
* a Texas or federal choice-of-law statute;
221
* a contract's choice-of-law clause;
222
* a dispositive choice-of-law rule from an issue-specific
section of the Second Restatement that does not involve
the most-significant-relationship test;
223
federal common-law tests in admiralty, bankruptcy, and
other cases;
224
221. E.g., Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 641 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (applying Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.42 to
compel the application of Texas law over Missouri law); Owens-Coming v. Carter,
997 S.W.2d 560, 571-72 (Tex. 1999) (applying Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
71.031 to resolve a limitations question).
222. E.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Greenbrier N. Section II, 835 S.W.2d 720,
723 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (upholding parties' choice of
New York law in mortgage-deficiency suit).
223. E.g., Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1142 (5th
Cir. 1992) (applying Second Restatement section 201, which designates the law
chosen by the parties' choice-of-law agreement to control fraud-in-the-inducement
claims).
224. E.g., Arochem Corp. v. Wilomi, Inc., 962 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1992)
(using a federal common-law choice-of-law test to choose English law over United
States law for maritime claims for wrongful arrest of cargo). These federal tests may
also apply in state courts where concurrent jurisidiction exists over some maritime
claims. See Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp., 992 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1999) (involving a
personal-injury claim for offshore accident near Trinidad).
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* a dispute governed by public international law, such as
the conflict between local and foreign-country discovery
rules;
22 5
* the application of another state's choice-of-law rule
because of an inconvenient venue transfer;
226
9 Erie22 7 or reverse-Erie 228 analyses resolving a state-
federal conflict of law;
* a party's failure to plead or prove the content of foreign
225. E.g., AG Volkswagen v. Valdez, 897 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1995), aff'd, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (applying the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States section 442 to
a local discovery request to be performed in Germany, in violation of its law).
226. Venue transfers for the convenience of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1404
require the use of the transferor court's choice-of-law rule. See, e.g., Indus. Indem.
Co. v. Chapman & Cutler, 22 F.3d 1346 (5th Cir. 1994) (involving a case transferred
from California federal court, resulting in the Texas federal court applying
California's interest-analysis choice-of-law rule).
227. Erie conflicts between state and federal law arise most often in lawsuits
brought to federal court under diversity of citizenship, where state law governs
substantive issues but sometimes overlaps with federal procedural law. See Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no federal common law
and that federal courts should apply state law in diversity cases except where the
subject matter involves the United States Constitution or acts of Congress). An
interesting Erie conflict arose in J.M Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897
(S.D. Tex. 1971). Defendants argued that Libyan law controlled the right to jury trial,
which the court considered both as a Texas conflicts question (under the Texas
choice-of-law rule, what law governs the right to jury trial?), and an Erie conflict
(does the Texas choice-of-law rule apply, or is this just a matter of federal procedural
law?). The issue was further complicated by the parties' choice-of-law agreement
pointing to California law. Id. at 899-901. The court did the obvious and applied
federal law to the jury issue. Id. at 900. Couch also dealt with choice of law on the
substantive tort claim. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (presenting a
negligence case under Texas law for an incident that occurred in Libya).
228. "Reverse Erie" occurs when a state court is confronted with a federal-state
conflict to which preemption does not apply. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 645 S.W.2d
288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (dealing with a federal-state conflict regarding
admissibility of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purposes). The court
held that, if the prior conviction were federal, it did not follow that federal law
controlled the admissibility of that conviction in a subsequent state case, and that
instead, state law controlled. Id. at 291-92. The court cited, without discussion,
Second Restatement sections 137-38, providing that forum law governs the
admissibility of, respectively, witnesses and evidence. Id. at 291-92 & n.5. It is not
clear from this citation whether the court believed that the Restatement applies to
federal-state conflicts issues. It was not intended to do so. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. c (1971).
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law (thus causing a default to Texas law);2 29 and
* criminal cases.230
Of the 119 choice-of-law analyses, 25 contain language
indicating the use of a Currie-type approach. These twenty-five ranged
from the invocation of a single Currie element (e.g., the Currie false
conflict used in Duncan), to mixes of Currie's test with the most-
significant-relationship test, to the extreme of pure interest analyses
that ignored the Second Restatement's elements.231 The results are
further broken down in the chart below, where cases indicates the total
229. E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd., 82 S.W.3d 429, 437 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2002, no pet.) (holding that failure to give notice or proof of Nigerian law
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 203 invoked the presumption that foreign law is
the same as the law of the forum).
230. This study does not include criminal cases; although eight criminal
decisions have considered choice-of-law issues since 1979. See Richardson v. State,
744 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (concerning the validity of Oklahoma
common-law marriage for purposes of spousal privilege); Tompkins v. State, 774
S.W.2d 195, 215-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), aff'dper curiam, 490 U.S. 754 (1989)
(involving a patient-psychiatrist privilege arising in Virginia); Hawkins v. State, 745
S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd) (refusing judicial notice of
California law regarding agent's right to carry a handgun); Alvarado v. State, 853
S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (discussing confession obtained by Mexican
police; not so much a choice-of-law analysis as a scope-of-Miranda analysis);
Davidson v. State, 977 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998), aff'd, 25 S.W.3d
183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (determining the admissibility of confession to federal
officer in Montana); Gonzalez v. State, 21 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2000) (dealing with a priest-penitent privilege arising in California); Davidson
v. State, 25 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (deciding the admissibility
of confession to federal officer in Montana); Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002) (addressing the admissibility ofjuvenile's confession in Illinois).
Of those eight, none inappropriately applied interest analysis; although several
appropriately considered governmental interests as a factor.
231. The following indicators were used to identify Currie-influenced choice-of-
law cases: (1) using the term "false conflict" to mean a state not having an interest; (2)
using a finding of non-interest to eliminate a state from the choice-of-law calculus,
whether the term "false conflict" was used or not; (3) analyzing contacts and other
factors purely in terms of governmental interest; (4) phrasing the conclusion in
governmental-interest terms; (5) failing to consider factors other than governmental
interests; (6) counting contacts, equating the count with state interest, and then using
that finding to reach the choice-of-law conclusion. However, cases were not labeled
as Currie-oriented merely for considering governmental interests, or even turning on
governmental interests, as long as other choice-of-law factors were examined. E.g.,
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 679 (Tex. 1990) (holding that the law
of the state with materially greater interest should govern instead of the parties'
choice-of-law clause).
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number of choice-of-law analyses governed by the most-significant-
relationship test (including and after Gutierrez), and I-A indicates the
number of cases invoking Currie's interest analysis (either partly or
fully):
Court Cases I-A Percentage
Texas Supreme Court 9 2 22.22
Intermediate appellate courts 41 6 14.63
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 35 8 22.86
Federal district courts in Texas 34 9 26.47
Totals 119 25 21.01%
It is important to note that the I-A numbers do not include all
cases in which governmental interest was a factor-governmental
interest accounts for two of the seven policy considerations in section 6
of the Second Restatement.2 32 Instead, the I-A number is limited to
cases in which the interest is driving the analysis rather than merely
being part of the balance. Under the Second Restatement's approach,
governmental interest may decide the balance, but it does not guide the
analysis.
A. Texas State Courts
In spite of Duncan's mixing of tests,233 Texas state courts are
far less likely than federal courts to include a Currie-type interest
analysis. Of the 50 applications of the most-significant-relationship
test in Texas state courts since 1979, only eight (16%) have used some
aspect of Currie's test. Federal courts, including federal district courts
in Texas and Fifth Circuit opinions applying the Texas choice-of-law
rule, applied aspects of Currie's test in seventeen of sixty-nine cases, or
24.64% of the time.
1. The Texas Supreme Court
Of its nine choice-of-law opinions under the most-significant-
relationship test, the Texas Supreme Court has twice used or been
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
233. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421-22 (Tex. 1984).
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influenced by a Currie-type interest analysis. Unfortunately, the first
case is the seminal Duncan case, perhaps explaining the later courts'
misapplication.
a. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
Duncan, the case adopting the most-significant-relationship test
as the Texas common-law standard, also invoked Currie's interest
analysis. Duncan involved wrongful-death claims in an air crash in
New Mexico, but the specific issue in front of the supreme court was
contract, specifically a release signed in an earlier lawsuit. 234 Carolyn
Parker Duncan was the widow of a man killed, along with pilot
Smithson, when a Cessna 150 crashed in New Mexico, and a faulty seat
design failed to protect them on impact.235 In a prior lawsuit, Duncan
had sued the plane's owner, Air Plains West, in federal court in Dallas;
the case settled, and Duncan signed a global release excusing Air Plains
West and related agents and entities, and more importantly, "any other
corporations or persons whomsoever responsible therefor, whether
named herein or not.,
23 6
Duncan and Smithson then sued Cessna in a Texas state court,
and Cessna raised the defense of release based on the global-release
language in the prior suit's settlement. Under New Mexico law, global
releases mean what they say and are effective as to nonparties. 237 The
law in Texas was not clear, with splits in the courts of appeals that were
later resolved in In re Estate of Garcia-Chapa to apply only to
specifically identified parties.238
The trial court honored the release and ordered a take-nothing
judgment for Duncan's claim against Cessna, but it did find Cessna at
fault and ordered damages for Smithson.239 The Austin Court of
Appeals reversed as to Duncan, and found that the release did not apply
because Cessna was not named.240 The court of appeals further rejected
234. Id. at 417.
235. Id. at 418.
236. Id. (emphasis deleted).
237. Id. at 420 (citing Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 521 P.2d 1037 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1974)).
238. 33 S.W.3d 859, 862 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see also
infra Part III.A.2.f.
239. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 417.
240. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375, 380-81 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1982), rev'd, 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (applying Texas law to the release
under a lex loci contractus rule, based on the release being signed in Texas).
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Duncan's argument for a choice of Texas law under a Second
Restatement analysis, ruling that, in spite of the most-significant-
relationship test's advantages, its application to contract claims would
have to await the Texas Supreme Court's action extending Gutierrez
beyond tort law.241 The court remanded Duncan's claim for jury
trial, 242 but Cessna immediately appealed the choice-of-law issue to the
Texas Supreme Court, which reversed, reaching the same result (that
Texas law applied) under a new choice-of-law test.
243
The Texas Supreme Court wasted little language (two
paragraphs) in adopting the most-significant-relationship test-already
adopted for torts in Gutierrez244-for "all choice of law cases, except
those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice
of law clause." 245 The court further explained that by "most significant
relationship," it meant the seven-factor test stated in section 6 of the
Second Restatement. 246 By limiting its express adoption to section 6,
the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated its unfamiliarity with the most-
significant-relationship test, which operates through a number of
choice-of-law presumptions to be followed unless another state has a
more significant relationship under the policy factors in section 6.247 In
241. Id. Duncan argued that her claim should be characterized as a tort
(wrongful death), and that under Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979),
the Second Restatement's section 170 (regarding the law governing tort releases)
would apply.
242. The court also ordered retrial of Smithson's claims because of improper
evidence. Id. at 390.
243. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 420-21.
244. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 315-16 (Tex. 1979).
245. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421. In addition, the most-significant-relationship
test does not apply if a forum statute directs the choice of law. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971). It also may not apply if the parties
have a valid choice-of-law agreement under section 187(1). In addition, the Second
Restatement as a whole does not apply to state-federal choice-of-law problems. Id. §
2 cmt. c. Further, the Second Restatement may be preempted by federal common law
for important federal policy reasons. See, e.g., Volkswagen v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d
900 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). Valdez concerned a conflict between Texas and
German law on discovery relating to a German company's telephone book. The
Texas Supreme Court overturned the trial judge's order compelling discovery, finding
that the lower court had failed to balance the parties' interests and failed to consider
German law, as suggested by the Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 442 (1987). Id. at 902.
246. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 420-21 (referring to its prior action in Gutierrez,
583 S.W.2d at 318).
247. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. It is important to note
that the Second Restatement uses the term "policy factors" to refer to all seven factors
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spite of this narrow adoption expressly limited to section 6, nothing
thus far indicated anything outside the Second Restatement.
The deviation began in the opinion's next paragraph, after the
court identified the choice-of-law contacts, in its conclusion that
"[s]ome contacts are more important than others because they implicate
state policies underlying the particular substantive issue.
Consequently, selection of the applicable law depends on the
qualitative nature of the particular contacts." 248 Indeed, the contacts'
quality is more important than their mere number, but the proper
implication is not merely for the related governmental policies. The
contacts evaluation ought to include all seven policy factors in section
6, several of which are unrelated to or go beyond governmental
interests. One example, pertinent in Duncan, is party expectation.
24 9
The next paragraph of the opinion then recited the pertinent
contacts: Duncan's husband lived in Texas and worked in New
Mexico; pilot Smithson lived and worked in New Mexico; the
airplane's defective seats were designed and manufactured in Kansas;
the airplane entered service in Texas; owner Air Plains West is a New
Mexico corporation; and plaintiff Duncan executed the release in Texas
250to settle a federal lawsuit in Texas. Unstated here was that the crash
occurred in New Mexico, 251 and while that fact had only indirect
relevance to the contract question at issue here, the supreme court's
ignoring of that fact missed a possibly crucial analytical point. The
underlying action was a tort claim, and Second Restatement section 170
provides that the effect of one tortfeasor's release on a joint tortfeasor
is determined by the law chosen by section 145, the general tort
principle. 252 Section 145's four contacts-place of injury, place of
in section 6, both the governmental-interest factors and the ones transcending single-
state issues, such as the needs of the interstate and international system, party
expectations, and efficiency.
248. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421.
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) & cmt. g
(stating that protection of a party's justified expectation is important because it would
be unfair to hold him liable when he had molded his conduct to conform to another
state's requirements and because this factor is the one that allows parties to choose the
law that will govern the validity of their contract). See also id. § 188 cmt. b
(explaining the primacy of party expectation in contract law); id. § 222 cmt. b
(providing the same for property law).
250. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421.
251. Id. at 418.
252. Second Restatement section 170(b) states: "The law selected by the
application of the rule of § 145 determines whether a particular instrument is a release
or a covenant not to sue with respect to joint tortfeasors who are not parties to the
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wrongful conduct, party domicile, and center of relationship-probably
still weigh in favor of Texas law, but not as clearly as the court's
decision under its simpler application of section 6 alone. The defendant
had a better argument under section 145, and the court's omission of
the New Mexico contact (a tort contact) accompanies its omission of an
entire line of reasoning and suggests an outcome-oriented test. The
fault here is not in the court's predisposition, but in interest analysis.
Under Currie's narrow eye, Texas law prevails because New Mexico,
in fact, had no "interest" in governing this particular contract claim
between a Texas widow and a Kansas defendant, regarding a release
signed in Texas to settle a Texas lawsuit. But if the Second
Restatement is allowed to function, the argument expands to encompass
this claim's tort aspects. Although this omission was almost certainly
harmless in Duncan (which was rightly governed by Texas law),
similar omissions and singular analyses could produce injustice in other
cases.
Duncan's Currie approach was magnified at the end of the same
paragraph, where the court stated that "[t]he beginning point for
evaluating these contacts is the identification of the policies or
'governmental interests,' if any, of each state in the application of its
rule. ' " This statement is perfectly in line with a Currie interest
analysis, 254 and it is misleading at best as to section 6 and the most-
significant-relationship test. Except for a few issues where state
interest is paramount (as in the use of the forum's own procedure255 and
certain property issues 256), the Second Restatement does not instruct
this approach to choice-of-law analysis. To the contrary, the comments
to section 6 specify that the factors are not listed in any order of
importance.257 Under the Currie approach highlighted in Duncan, the
choice-of-law analysis will default to the single state deemed to have an
interest. Under a Second Restatement analysis, the disinterested state is
less likely to be chosen, but the analysis will continue with any other
instrument." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 170(b). As reported
by the court of appeals, Mrs. Duncan argued for section 170's application at trial,
Duncan, 632 S.W.2d at 380, no doubt to bring her claim under section 145, already
blessed by Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. 1979).
253. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
254. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
Currie-style analysis in two Fifth Circuit cases). See also SCOLES, supra note 3, at 28-
30; RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 241-58.
255. See supra note 15.
256. See supra note 16.




The Duncan court continued examining governmental interests,
assessing New Mexico's state interests as nil because the immediate
issue was not the air crash that occurred there, but rather, Duncan's
release signed in Texas. 258 If the release were effective in this second
lawsuit, the benefit would flow to Cessna, a Kansas corporation, with
no benefit to a New Mexico-based party.259 Texas, on the other hand,
had two interests: its abolition of the "unity of release" rule (which was
not fully resolved until this case),260 and Duncan's expectation that
Texas law would govern. 261 The court underscored its Currie approach
in the concluding paragraph to the choice-of-law analysis:
An analysis of the relevant state contacts reveals that
New Mexico has no underlying interest in the
application of its law, while Texas has important
interests in allowing Duncan's action against Cessna.
In this situation, known as a 'false conflict," it is an
established tenet of modern conflicts law that the law of
the interested state should apply.
262
The court relied on references to three leading conflicts
authorities, a reading of which produces informative results. All three
explain the operation of false conflicts and attribute it to Currie, but do
not necessarily endorse it.
The first is Professor Martin, who acknowledged that the false
conflict was Currie's greatest contribution and that it was accepted by a
great majority of courts.263 Professor Martin also noted a problem with
courts' freedom to define forum interest broadly, and, if they wished, to
258. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421.
259. Kansas law was not considered because no party had raised it. Id. at 421
n.6.
260. Id. at 422. In abolishing the unity of release rule (that is, limiting global
releases to identified parties), the supreme court resolved a 2-to-I court of appeals
split. Id. at 419-20.
261. Id. at 422.
262. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 422 (citing J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 85 (1980)) (emphasis added); see also E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.6 at 17 (1982) (discussing "false conflicts" in conflict-of-laws
cases).
263. J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 85
(1980).
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almost never apply another state's law. 264 Martin further noted that
"Currie's recommended treatment of the true conflict situation was by
far the more controversial part of his scheme of analysis.
'" 265
Duncan's second academic reference is a prior edition of the
Scoles treatise, which, like Martin, praised interest analysis.
Specifically, it reported Currie's false conflict as having "found
widespread acceptance in American conflicts law since Currie,"266 and
added that the breakdown in Currie's system was only in its resolution
of true conflicts. 267 The current edition of the Scoles treatise, published
in 2000, has qualified its praise to observe that false conflicts analysis
"is neither controversial nor controvertible, at least for those who
subscribe to the view that consideration of state interests is a proper
starting point for resolving conflicts of laws. 268 The new edition also
reports that "[w]hile judicial support for Currie's approach has
decreased dramatically in recent years, his analysis 'still controls the
academic conflicts agenda,' although its 'new critics' seem to
outnumber its old and new defenders."
269
Duncan's third academic reference is a prior edition of
Professor Weintraub's treatise, 2 7 which remains in its current edition a
strong endorsement of interest analysis but with a functional approach
that considers other factors. 271 More of a snythesizer than a criticizer,
264. Id. (noting that "some courts have claimed an 'interest' in dispensing justice
where no interest otherwise exists") (citing Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W. 469 (Mo. App.
1972)).
265. Id. at 86.
266. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 262, at 17.
267. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 262, at 17 n. 19.
268. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 29. Contrary to this statement, false conflicts
analysis has stirred criticism. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, True "False Conflicts, "Et
Alia, 48 B.U. L. REv. 164, 169 (1968) ("This technique of using the deprecative label
[of false conflict] to buttress a result independently reached could be used equally well
by followers of any choice-of-law theory."); Reppy, supra note 11, at 647; John Hart
Ely, Choice ofLaw and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 173, 176-78 (1983); Westen, supra note 24, at 80.
269. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 34 & n.47 (quoting Kurt H. Nadelmann,
Internationales Privatrecht: A Sourcebook on Conflicts Theory Analyzed and
Reviewed, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 657, 672 (1976)).
270. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.1, at
48 & § 2.6, at 267-68 (2d ed. 1980).
271. Professor Weintraub, although certainly an interest analyst, has kept a
somewhat more objective distance from the fray than some conflicts scholars. One
example is his criticism of Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d
719 (Cal. 1976), whose result, Weintraub argued, showed that interest analysis needed
further development and should be balanced with other principles such as the
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Professor Weintraub has noted that, while "[i]t is sometimes said that
this 'most significant relationship test' of the Second Restatement
differs fundamentally from the 'interest analysis' associated with
Professor Brainerd Currie," 272 his disagreement with the Second
Restatement is limited to choice-of-law exercises lacking inquiry into
the conflicting laws' purposes, and specific property sections that
retained territorial rules. 273 Nonetheless, Professor Weintraub supports
a Second Restatement analysis that includes a proper interest analysis,
where contacts are evaluated in light of the purposes behind the
conflicting states' laws.
2 74
Thus, on Duncan's false-conflicts point, one of the three
scholarly sources-Martin--did not endorse false conflicts at the time;
another-the Scoles treatise-now has qualified its support as being
limited to those who agree with governmental interests as the starting
point; and the third-Weintraub--continues to support both interest
analysis and false conflicts. Other critics are more severe, as discussed
above.275
Missing from Duncan's false-conflicts point is any reference to
the Second Restatement. None is possible. The Second Restatement
does not use the term false conflict even once-not in the black-letter
sections, not in the comments, not in the Reporter's Notes. The Second
Restatement's only allusion to a false conflict is to that term's other
meaning, where the laws of all pertinent states are the same or would
reach the same result.
276
avoidance of unfair surprise to the defendant. Russell J. Weintraub, The Future of
Choice ofLawfor Torts: What Principles Should Be Preferred?, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 146, 159-62 (1977).
272. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 7-8.
273. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 7-8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 (1971) (governing the validity and effect of conveyance of
interest in land); id. § 260 (addressing intestate succession to movables)).
274. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 7-8, 357-58, 458-61.
275. See, e.g., supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
276. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. i; id. § 186
cmt. c. Both comments are entitled, "When rule in two or more states is the same"
and provide that in such cases, the contacts are treated as if from a single state. It is
unclear what the drafters' purpose was here. One effect is to group the contacts, and
thus to enhance the calculation against any differing states. An opposite effect is to
treat multiple states as one; thus limiting their collective impact on the analysis. In
spite of this failure to use the term "false conflict," the subsequent Reporter's Notes
refer to discussions of false conflicts of both kinds-the no-legal-difference kind and
the disinterested-state kind. See id. § 145 reporter's note to cmt. i (citing Leflar, supra
note 268, at 171-74 and other sources). The Second Restatement does not discuss
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Duncan reached the correct conclusion in spite of its
unfortunate hybrid choice-of-law test. A proper analysis, either limited
to section 6 or including section 188,277 would almost certainly hold
that Texas had the more significant relationship to Duncan's release,
which was signed to settle a Texas lawsuit. Although the release's
other party-Air Plains West-was a New Mexico entity, its
expectations of the law governing this release were irrelevant in the
second lawsuit against Cessna. Cessna, the party invoking the release,
had little or no right to any expectation of governing law for a contract
between other parties. The court adequately considered the
governmental interests of Texas and New Mexico, also pointing to
Texas law, and the only other section-6 factor implicated here is ease of
application, again favoring Texas law. Reaching the right result under
the wrong test worked no harm in Duncan, but it may have led to
wrong results in its application to later cases.
Before continuing with other cases using some aspect of
Currie's interest analysis, an important question must be addressed.
Given the Duncan court's saying one thing (adopting the Second
Restatement's most-significant-relationship test as enunciated in
section 6), and doing another (a Currie interest analysis that ignored
several aspects of section 6), just what is the choice-of-law test in
Texas? The argument can be made that because of Duncan's
application, the test is a hybrid of the Second Restatement with an
emphasis on government-interest analysis as articulated by Professor
Currie. I contend that the two are incompatible. If Currie's approach is
the rule, then much of the Second Restatement is irrelevant, and in fact,
much of section 6 is irrelevant. The better reading is that the Texas
Supreme Court intended then and now that the Texas courts use the
most-significant-relationship test from section 6, and other sections
subsequently adopted. 278 In 288 choice-of-law opinions since 1979,
false conflicts as eliminating the need for any choice-of-law analysis where all laws
are the same, perhaps because the drafters deemed the point obvious. Professor Leflar
did explain that application, as do other scholars. See Leflar, supra note 268, at 171
(discussing absurd results from choice-of-law analyses where there were no conflicts
of laws).
277. Second Restatement § 188 is the general contract principle in the absence of
a choice-of-law clause. See infra note 418.
278. Professor Weintraub points out that "[a]t least in the early cases, such as
Duncan, the Supreme Court of Texas indicated that although it would be guided by
R2d, the Court reserved the right to reject the Restatement when it did not accord with
the principles in sec. 6. See Duncan fn. 4." E-mail from Russell Weintraub, Professor
of Law, University of Texas School of Law, to James George, Professor of Law,
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Texas state and federal courts have applied or cited twenty-nine topic-
specific choice-of-law sections,279 along with the more basic subject-
matter sections 145, 187, and 188. The better argument is that the
most-significant-relationship test is the law in Texas, with unadopted
sections serving as persuasive authority.
b. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman
280
Like Duncan, the Texas Supreme Court's other Currie-
influenced case uses Second Restatement elements and reaches a
plausible conclusion, but it does not apply the most-significant-
relationship test as stated in section 6. Torrington was a wrongful-
death action on behalf of two Marines killed in a helicopter crash in
Alabama. The Marines were from Michigan and Nebraska, but were
based in North Carolina. Texas-based Bell Helicopter was the
manufacturer of the helicopter, and the defective rotor bearing was
made in Connecticut. 28 1 The jury awarded more than thirty-five million
dollars in actual damages (remitted to twenty-nine million dollars) and
fifty million dollars in punitive damages (remitted to five million
dollars); the court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award and
affirmed the rest.282 On supreme-court review, the only choice-of-law
dispute was which law governed compensatory damages. Defendant
Torrington argued for the application of Michigan or Nebraska law
because those states were the decedents' domiciles; both Michigan and
Nebraska law greatly reduced plaintiffs' damages.283 Plaintiffs' choice
Texas Wesleyan School of Law (Aug. 27, 2003). That Duncan expressly limited its
adoption to section 6 is clear. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421
(Tex. 1984). Because of that limited adoption, and because of the court's use of other
Second Restatement sections going back to Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W. 2d 312, in
1979 (following section 145, the general tort principle) and Robertson v. McKnight,
609 S.W.2d 534, in 1980 (following section 169, spousal tort immunity), it is also
clear that the Texas Supreme Court is adopting the Second Restatement sections only
as needed. See James P. George, Choice of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25
TEX. TECH L. REv. 833, 842 n.32 (1994) (stating that the court in Duncan adopted
only the most-significant-relationship test and not the entire Second Restatement).
279. See infra Appendix B (listing Texas state and federal cases in the Fifth
Circuit applying the Texas choice-of-law rules that considered topic-specific sections
of the Second Restatement).
280. 46 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2000).
281. Id. at 833, 849.
282. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 36 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 46 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2000).
283. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 848 n. 16. Michigan law did not award mental
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was Texas law, and no other states were considered.284
The Texas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's choice of
Texas law, relying heavily on interest analysis applied under sections 6
285and 145. In Torrington, however, interest analysis was appropriate
286because of its emphasis on the Second Restatement's tort sections.
But the supreme court over indulged in a Currie analysis on at least
three points, none of which undermined the conclusion. First, at the
beginning of the choice-of-law analysis, after quoting sections 6 and
145, the court stated that the number of contacts was not determinative
and that, instead, "we must evaluate the contacts in light of the state
policies underlying the particular substantive issues." 287 This may be
nothing more than stock language quoted from Duncan and used to
preface the actual analysis. Nonetheless, it mischaracterizes the Second
Restatement's multifactored approach, and should not be used even as a
prefacing statement. A better statement is that "[s]ection 6's criteria
provide the means for qualitatively weighing the contacts uncovered on
section 145's list."
288
Torrington's second Currie deviation is in the following
sentence: "Texas is the forum state and the parties acquiesced to the
trial court's application of Texas law to the liability issue. 289
Although the Second Restatement does not catalogue state interests, it
does provide that where the forum's only contact is being the place of
anguish damages. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(6) (West 1986). Nebraska
law limited recovery to pecuniary losses. NEB. REv. STAT. 30.810 (1995).
284. The trial court held that North Carolina, the Marines' duty post, had the
most significant relationship to the claims, but that law was not used because no party
introduced evidence of its content. The parties later agreed that North Carolina and
Texas laws were the same on the damages issue. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 848. The
supreme court observed that "Torrington does not contend that the law of Connecticut,
where the bearing was manufactured, should apply." Id. at 849 n. 18. Alabama-the
crash site-is never mentioned as a contender, showing how completely Texas courts
have abandoned their pre-Gutierrez views.
285. Id. at 848.
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. e (1971); id. §
145 cmt. b (discussing the importance of state interests in tort cases).
287. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 848 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984)).
288. Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l Inc., 639 F. Supp. 385, 390 (E.D. Tex.
1986).
289. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d. at 850 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(g), but apparently meaning to cite section 6(2)0), dealing
with "ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied").
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trial, its interest is limited to procedural issues.290 In Torrington, of
course, Texas had additional interests because the accident occurred
there, but nothing in the Second Restatement suggests that merely
being the forum counts separately as a forum-state interest in having
forum law applied. To do so would unduly emphasize the forum's
preference for its own law, which is already favored in the
presumptions that if plaintiff fails to prove the content of foreign law,
or fails to prove a conflict between forum and foreign law, then forum
law applies. 291 These presumptions are further reinforced by the
forum's inherent and often unstated inclination to apply its own law
and to slant choice-of-law analyses in that direction. Although the
Second Restatement does not count forum status as an interest,
Currie's method does, resulting in an overwhelming favoring of forum
law that is clearly reflected in Torrington.292 The same sentence stated
that the parties' acquiescence to the trial court's application of Texas
law to liability issues was an additional interest supporting the
application of Texas law to the damages issue. This conclusion is
contrary to the edict to treat choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis,
expressed both in Duncan293 and in the Second Restatement.294
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. e.
291. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Boustany, 73 S.W.3d 225,229 (Tex. 2002); Am.
Int'l Trading Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 835 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1987);
Unocal Corp. v. Dickinson Res., Inc., 889 S.W.2d 604,607 n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 607
n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ. denied); Thyssen Steel Co. v. MV
Kavo Yerakas, 911 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Holden v. Capri Lighting,
Inc., 960 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ); Houston Cas. Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 51 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (S.D. Tex. 1999); In
re Estate of Garcia-Chapa, 33 S.W.3d 859, 862 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no
pet.); Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 79 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2002, no pet.); Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd., 82 S.W.3d 429, 438 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
292. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 704-09 (discussing Currie's favoritism for the
lexfori).
293. Duncan stated that "all choice of law cases, except those cases in which the
parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be applied to resolve
that issue." 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984) (emphasis added). This practice is
known as d~peqage and is implicitly promoted by the Second Restatement's use of
distinct sections focused on a variety of issues such as capacity to contract. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 198; id. Introductory Note to ch. 8,
topic 1, tit. c, at 631 (observing that although most cases will be governed by a single
law, on occasion an approach directed to the particular issue will be appropriate). See
also SCOLES, supra note 3, at 922-24 (discussing ddpecage in the Second
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Torrington's third Currie tendency was the choice-of-law
analysis itself. The court considered the purpose of compensatory
damages, and the interests of Texas, Michigan, and Nebraska,
concluding that Texas policies outweighed those of the other states.295
Unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court found that Michigan and
Nebraska had an interest, but that it was outweighed by the Texas
interest as the principal situs of two defendants, Bell and Textron.
296
The section-145 contacts were analyzed almost entirely in terms of
states' interests. The only other section-6 factor applied was ease in
determination and application of the law from section 6(2)(g). This has
already been discussed above as a likely misapplication of this
factor, 297 leaving the opinion with an almost pure state-interest
discussion. Because the issue was damages, and because the Second
Restatement strongly emphasizes "the state with the dominant interest"
for damages issues, the court's analysis is at least adequate. 29 On the
other hand, Torrington's orientation toward interest analysis is
Restatement); WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 94-101 (addressing dipevage generally).
See, e.g., CPS Int'l, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18, 34-35 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1995, writ denied) (using Texas law for the contract claims and Saudi law for
tort claims); Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying Texas law to the tort-liability issues and California law to the issue of
successor-entity liability, and quoting section 302 cmt. d of the Second Restatement:
"The courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues under
the local law of a single state.").
294. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. f
(offering the example of a husband negligently injuring his wife -for example, in a
car wreck--outside their home state, and suggesting that the situs jurisdiction has the
greater interest in determining liability, while the domiciliary jurisdiction has the
greater interest in determining spousal immunity). See also id § 145 cmt. d; id § 188
cmt. d ("Each issue is to receive separate consideration if it is the one which would be
resolved differently under the local law rule of the of two or more of the potentially
interested states.").
295. Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 848-49.
296. Id. at 849-50.
297. See supra note 289.
298. A heavy use of state-interest analysis is justified in Torrington, in which the
choice-of-law issue was limited to damages. Second Restatement section 178 governs
damages, and although its black-letter language simply defers to section 175 (which
presumes that accident situs law governs unless some other state has a more
significant relationship), the commentary provides that "[i]n general, this should be
the state which has the dominant interest in the determination of this issue."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 178 cmt. b, cited in Torrington, 46
S.W.3d at 849. Thus worded, it is at best a strong presumption that deserves a slightly
more thorough analysis under section 6.
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demonstrated in its vocabulary, in its mischaracterization of the Second
Restatement as counting forum status and the application of forum law
to other issues, and in the actual analysis that excludes other section-6
factors.
2. The Texas Courts of Appeals
The Texas courts of appeals have made post-Gutierrez use of
the most-significant-relationship test 41 times, with only six cases
(14.64%) involving aspects of a Currie interest analysis. This
percentage gives the courts of appeals, collectively, the best record of
the four court systems involved, but where they strayed was sometimes
far from the baseline.
a. Texas Commerce Bank National Ass'n
v. Interpol 80 L.P.
299
Texas Commerce used a choice-of-law analysis as a factor in a
personal-jurisdiction contest regarding a Colorado partnership's oil-
and-gas venture in Texas. Interpol contracted with Lewis Energy
Corporation to purchase a 12.5% working interest in oil-and-gas leases
in Live Oak and Karnes counties. Although Interpol paid its
obligations up to a point, the drilling stopped before the well reached its
"casing point" that would vest Interpol's ownership interest. Lewis and
Interpol disagreed over further operations, and after Lewis's
bankruptcy, assignee Texas Commerce Bank sued Interpol for
$63,076.77, its share of unpaid costs.300 The trial court dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Interpol was not doing
business in Texas.30 ' In reversing, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
employed Texas choice-of-law rules to show that Texas law would
apply, thus illustrating Texas's "special interest" in the case.30 2 To
reach this finding, the court first noted that "accepted choice of law
principles provide that the law of the state which is the situs of the
property would govern the validity of the contract to sell the property
and the rights created thereby. 30 3 The court quoted a pre-Duncan
299. 703 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
300. Id. at 768-69.
301. Id. at 768.
302. Id. at 773-74.
303. Id. at 773.
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precedent for this proposition,304 but reinforced it with a citation to
section 189 of the Second Restatement, which supports the court to
some extent. Section 189 governs contract validity for land interest
transfers and presumes that the law of the land's situs will control; that
presumption may be rebutted if another state has a more significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties. 30 5 Although Colorado
easily could have been shown not to have a more significant
relationship under section 6's factors, 30 6 the court ignored this follow-
through with section 189, and pursued a different approach.
One problem was the court's lack of focus on the issue-was it
Interpol's debt on drilling expenses or Interpol's debt for the mineral
interest's purchase price? This confusion is evident in the court's next
reference, an outdated Texas choice-of-law rule that "if a contract is
made in one state but relates to and is to be performed in another state,
the law of the place of performance governs." 30 7 The court then recited
pertinent facts, including the contract's formation in Colorado and
performance in Texas, and the crucial fact of the contract's purpose-
Texas mineral exploitation. 30 8 Then the court stated its conclusion that
"even under the 'most significant relationship' test of the Restatement,
Texas has a legitimate and even special interest in this suit."
309
304. Tex. Commerce, 703 S.W.2d at 773 (citing Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667
F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1982)).
305. Id. at 773-74.
306. Colorado's only connection was Interpol's status as a Colorado partnership.
Because there was no issue as to Interpol's partnership entity, and because no
activities occurred in Colorado (other than Interpol's monetary loss), none of the
section-6 factors is implicated here.
307. Tex. Commerce, 703 S.W.2d at 773 (citing pre-Duncan cases Castilleja v.
Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. 1967) and Smith v. Bidwell, 619 S.W.2d 445,
449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
308. Id. at 773-74.
309. Id. at 774 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 188 and related cases). As a postscript, the court noted that the Interpol-
Lewis contract had a choice-of-law agreement designating Texas law, a dispositive
point if the issue were choice of law. Id. For personal jurisdiction, however, a
choice-of-law clause is not dispositive of defendant's amenability but is merely a
contact with the forum state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,481
(1985). It is not clear what the choice-of-law analysis added.
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b. American Home Assurance Co. v.
Safway Steel Products Co., Inc.
310
American Home is the consolidation of two cases addressing
insurers' obligation to indemnify punitive damages. In one case,
Rawlings Sporting Goods lost a judgment, including a $750,000
punitive-damages award, to a high-school football player injured by a
failed helmet.311 The second case involved a failed steel scaffold for
which manufacturer Safway Steel Products Company had to pay $1
million in punitive damages. 312 Following these judgments, Rawlings
and Safway sued their respective insurers for coverage of the punitive
damages. Rawlings's case had connections to New York (the insurer's
state of incorporation and location), Missouri (Rawlings), and Texas
(the accident situs). 3 13  Safway had connections to Pennsylvania
(insurer's state of incorporation), New York (insurer's location),
Wisconsin (Safway), and Texas (accident situs). 3 14 The common
element for consolidation was seeking insurance indemnification for
punitive damages rendered by a Texas court.
The two trial courts found for Safway and Rawlings, and the
Austin Court of Appeals affirmed.315 In an extended choice-of-law
analysis, the court of appeals first found that a Texas insurance statute
directed the application of Texas law in spite of the contracts' having
been made in other states between non-Texas parties. 31 6 This decision
seems sound, given that the specific insured risks were in Texas, as
were the resulting lawsuits. Having reached this plausible conclusion,
the court of appeals continued with separate choice-of-law analyses,
invoking the Second Restatement sections 6 and 188, but based entirely
on an assessment of the various states' interests. The justification for
the overuse of state-interest analysis was the Second Restatement's
section 188 comment e, which the court read as directing the use of
section 188's contact factors (place of contracting, etc.) 3 17 as leading to
310. 743 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
311. Id. at 695.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 696.
314. Id.
315. Am. Home, 743 S.W.2d at 695.
316. Id. at 699-700. The Texas choice-of-law statute requires the application of
Texas law to certain Texas-based claims, no matter where the policy originated or
which law the policy may have designated. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42
(Vernon 2002).
317. Am. Home, 743 S.W.2d at 698.
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nothing more than indication of "which states are most likely
'interested' within the meaning of § 6.''318 Momentarily indicating a
larger understanding of the most-significant-relationship test, the court
observed that if comment e directed interest analysis for section 188(2),
then "at best, the § 188 factors only pertain to one part of a larger
analytical scheme that determines whose local law will be applied to
resolve the issue at hand., 319 But the court erred here in two regards.
First, the court failed to consider the entirety of section 188, in which
comment b gives priority to the contracting parties' justified
expectations and links that factor to the other section-6 factors of
certainty, predictability, and result uniformity. 320 Second, if the court
did understand that state interest is only a part of the analysis, it did not
follow through with the remaining policy factors in section 6.
Applying this approach, the court found the other kind of false
conflict (the proper kind) between Texas and Wisconsin-their
pertinent laws of contract construction were the same. But a true
conflict existed between Texas and Missouri laws on the issue of
whether the insurance policy covered punitive damages. The court
resolved this conflict with a pure interest analysis-identify the
interests of each state and "assess the relative strength of those interests
based primarily upon the specific contacts set forth in 188. ' '321 Then
the court found the other kind of false conflict (a Currie false conflict)
between Texas and New York, whose public policy forbade the
318. Id.
319. Id. (emphasis added). The term larger analytical scheme apparently
referred to section 6.
320. "Protection of justified expectations of the parties is the basic policy
underlying the field of contracts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
188 cmt. b. Section 188 has five comments. Comment a merely states that section
188 applies to contracts lacking a choice-of-law clause. Comment b (the longest) is
the first addressing section 188's content, and it prioritizes party expectation.
Comment c directs that courts consider the purpose of any particular state's contract
rule and to give it less weight (or no weight) if that purpose cannot be achieved. On
the other hand, comment c also provides that:
Frequently, it will be possible to decide a question of choice of law in
contract without paying deliberate attention to the purpose sought to be
achieved by the relevant contract rules of the interested states. This will be
so whenever by reason of the particular circumstances one state is obviously
that of the applicable law.
Id. §188 cmt. c.
321. Am. Home, 743 S.W.2d at 699.
550 [Vol. 23:3
FALSE CONFLICTS
insuring of punitive damages. Although this Article condemns the use
of Currie false conflicts in a Second Restatement analysis, the court
was correct in this instance not to consider New York law for the
specific issue of contract construction if New York law would void this
contract. The court also did something that many Currie analysts
would not do. When the issue of contract construction was resolved
(favoring the Texas interpretation that covered punitive damages), the
court addressed public-policy concerns, and, in doing so, reconsidered
the New York bar on insuring punitive damages. 32  The New York
policy lost, but it was fully considered at the policy level.323
At the close of the choice-of-law analysis, the court concluded
"that given the relevant state interests involved and the contacts of the
states to the question of policy coverage, the trial court properly applied
Texas law. 3 24 The opinion did not address party expectations as
directed both in section 188 comment b and section 6(2)(d). Neither
did the court address several other policy issues in section 6(2). This
could be a crucial omission. The insured-Rawlings -might have
expected to have punitive-damage insurance in states that allowed it.
On the other hand, the insurer might have thought such issues would be
governed by a single state's law, rather than being subject to variations
anywhere that Rawlings did business.
The court correctly resolved the issues under the pertinent
Texas choice-of-law statute325 but erred in its alternative analysis under
the most-significant-relationship test by focusing on interest analysis
and ignoring important policy factors that might have redirected this
case. One fault may have been the litigants' for failing to direct the
court's attention to those factors, but once the choice-of-law issue is
raised, the court should not conduct a short-circuited analysis just
because the parties have.
322. Id. at 700-01.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 700.
325. See supra note 316.
Summer 2004]
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
c. Trailways, Inc. v. Clark
326
Although American Home drew its interests analysis from a
partial reading of the Second Restatement section 188,327 the court in
Trailways followed Duncan's unfortunate dictum application of interest
328analysis. Trailways involved a bus crash in Mexico that killed two
Texas residents who had purchased their round-trip tickets to Mexico
City in Corpus Christi. They bought the tickets from American-based
carrier Trailways, which had an agreement with Mexican carrier
Transportes Del Norte ("TDN") to combine their services for trips from
the interior United States to the interior of Mexico. 329 The decedents
began the trip in Corpus Christi on a Trailways bus, then changed to a
TDN bus in Brownsville. At a ninety-degree turn about halfway
between Queretero and Mexico City, the bus turned over and killed the
decedents.
330
In determining that Texas law controlled, the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals first quoted Second Restatement sections 6, 145 (the
general tort section), and 175 (wrongful death),33' which is a very good
start. The court then noted that Duncan had stated that "the beginning
point in conflicts analysis is the identification of the policies or
governmental interest, if any, of each state in the application of its
law. ' 332 Although Duncan contains this language, the Second
Restatement does not, and as noted throughout this Article, this
approach may skew the choice-of-law analysis. The court then
considered the Second Restatement section 175's almost-mechanical
wrongful-death rule, applying the law of the accident's situs unless
"other competing factors would make the interests of one state any
more significant than those of the other."333 This reference to section
175 shows a misunderstanding of its content and function. Section 175
does not turn on state-interest calculations, but instead creates a
presumption that situs law controls in wrongful-death cases unless
some other state has a more significant relationship. That
326. 794 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
327. Am. Home, 743 S.W.2d at 696.
328. Trailways, 794 S.W.2d at 485.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 482.
331. Id. at 484-85.
332. Id. at 485 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,421 (Tex.
1984)).
333. Trailways, 749 S.W.2d at 485.
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determination-whether some other state has a more significant
relationship-rests on sections 6 and 145, in which state interest is one
of several factors. Rejecting section 175's presumption of situs law,
the court then conducted a pure state interest calculation leading to
Texas law.334  Although the court did list the pertinent contacts
meticulously, it analyzed them only according to its perception of the
interests of Texas and Mexico. 335 The court also quoted Gutierrez in a
manner suggesting that it endorsed interest analysis, which it did not.
33 6
As with American Home, the missing analysis in Trailways
could have resulted in a different outcome. A proper analysis under
sections 6, 145, and 175 could well point to Mexican law. Section 175
states a somewhat mechanical rule that situs law controls in wrongful-
death cases unless some other state has a more significant
relationship. 337 Thus, we start with a presumption that Mexican law
applies. To question this presumption, we examine the factors of
section 145 (the general tort principle) and then section 6's seven
policy factors. Section 145 focuses on four contacts, 338 with the first
two (accident site and the wrongful-conduct site) both being in Mexico.
The third and fourth contacts are mixed: the parties' domicile and
nationality are both rooted in Texas and Mexico, as is the site of the
decedent-defendant relationship (formed in Corpus Christi but
occurring mostly in Mexico). The court's analysis of these contacts
emphasized the ticket purchase in Corpus Christi, which occurred
through a Trailways office and did not directly involve the Mexican
carrier TDN. That alone does not seem sufficient to overcome the
presumption of Mexican law controlling.
To support its conclusion that the forum can apply its law to a
tort occurring outside the state, the court cited two cases, Wall v.
Noble339 and Kinnett v. Sky's West Parachute Center, Inc.340 Wall was
334. Id.
335. Id. at 485-87.
336. The Gutierrez reference read: "The trial judge, therefore, should have some
latitude in balancing legitimate competing state interests. See Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d
at 319." Trailways, 794 S.W.2d at 485. This quote apparently refers to the last
paragraphs in the Gutierrez choice-of-law section, where the Texas Supreme Court
explained that, although choice of law is a question of law, this case needed
remanding to the trial court for further fact finding. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d
312, 319 (Tex. 1979). Nothing in the Gutierrez discussion suggests applying a
choice-of-law analysis that is driven by state-interest analysis.
337. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971).
338. Id. § 145.
339. 705 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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a Texas malpractice action against a Texas-licensed plastic surgeon
with offices in Texas and Louisiana, the patient seeing him both
places. 341 Kinnett was a Wyoming wrongful-death lawsuit to recover
for an air crash over Colorado for a round-trip flight from Wyoming to
Texas.342 Neither case compares well with Trailways. As a medical-
malpractice case, Wall does not invoke the same policies or damage
considerations as a wrongful-death case, and it involved a doctor-
patient relationship created in Texas, a far greater contact than
purchasing a bus ticket. The Kinnett air crash in Colorado was
fortuitous-the flight from Wyoming to Texas was not intended to
touch down in Colorado, and the crash resulted from a mid-air
collision. The accident could have happened in any of several states.
The TDN bus accident was far less fortuitous, involving a ride from
Brownsville into Mexico. Any accident that was going to occur as a
fault of the Mexican carrier was almost certain to happen in Mexico.
The court's citation of two supporting cases can be countered by a
number of other cases applying the law of the accident's situs to facts
like these; that is, where the negligent conduct and the death occurred
in the same state. 343 This counterargument is not to say that choosing
Texas law was wrong. It is to say that the test should be correctly
applied in order to achieve more supportable results.
d. Vizcarra v. Roldan
344
Vizcarra is a personal-injury and family-consortium case arising
in Mexico. Defendant Vizcarra worked for defendant Rock Shop of El
Paso, and was on an errand to his employer's warehouse in Juarez.
340. 596 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Colo. 1984).
341. 705 S.W.2d at 733.
342. 596 F. Supp. at 1040.
343. E.g., Nailen v. Ford Motor Co., 873 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying
Mississippi's choice-of-law rule); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1426 (9th
Cir. 1989) (applying federal choice-of-law rule); Rottman v. Krabloonik, Inc., 834 F.
Supp. 1269, 1269, 1271 (D. Colo. 1993) (applying Colorado's choice-of-law rule);
Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 57-60 (Tenn. 1992) (applying Tennessee's
choice-of-law rule); Ricci v. Alternative Energy, Inc., 211 F.3d 157, 165 (1st Cir.
2000) (applying Maine's choice-of-law rule); Martineau v. Guertin, 751 A.2d 776,
778-81 (Vt. 2000) (applying Vermont's choice-of-law rule). For other cases following
Second Restatement section 175's presumption applying the law of the state where
conduct and injury occurred, see cases cited in support at RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971 & Supp. 2002).
344. 925 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
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While in Juarez, Vizcarra lost control of the pick-up and jumped a curb
in a residential area, striking plaintiff Roldan, who was standing in his
front yard. Plaintiff won at trial under Texas law. The court of appeals
reversed and held that Mexican law applied. Mexico's law had a more
limited damages scheme and did not allow for bystander claims, thus
eliminating the loss of consortium claims. Although the court of
appeals paid lip service to the contact factors under Second
Restatement section 145, it chose Texas law under a pure interest
analysis. The court limited its use of section 6 to the state-interest
factors and cited Duncan's unfortunate interest-analysis phrase,345
along with a similar phrase from another Texas case overemphasizing
state-interest factors. 346 In a final paragraph that almost pulls this case
within a proper Second Restatement range, the opinion included the
point that the facts did not "significantly impact any of the other
qualitative policy factors stated in Section 6 of the Restatement." 347 In
cases where only one or two policy factors matter, other choice-of-law
factors can often be dispensed with quickly. But the dispensation was
too brief in light of the court's fact analysis discussed only in terms of
state interest.
Unlike the results in American Home and Trailways, it is
difficult to see here where a more appropriate analysis-looking to all
contacts and policy factors in sections 6 and 145-would produce a
different result. Where a forum resident travels outside the state and
negligently injures people in their home state, hardly any of the Second
Restatement's factors would support the application of forum law. One
exception is if a forum's law was intended to govern its residents'348
conduct outside the state, but no such law applied here. Nonetheless,
345. Following the Duncan citation, the court noted parenthetically:
"(governmental interest of each forum is the 'beginning point' for determining most
significant relationship)." Vizcarra, 925 S.W.2d at 91 (paraphrasing Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984)).
346. The Vizcarra court stated parenthetically that "(relevant policies of the
forum is most critical consideration in determining most significant relationship)." Id.
(paraphrasing Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no
writ)).
347. Id. at 92.
348. Plaintiff argued this, using products-liability law as an example and citing
two federal diversity cases that applied Texas law to out-of-state incidents. Id. at 91
(citing Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242,250 (5th Cir. 1990) and
Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1140 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). The
Vizcarra court correctly pointed out that the state intent in regulating locally made
products, even in out-of-state use, differed greatly from the car accident liability
imposed in a master-servant context. Vizcarra, 925 S.W.2d at 91. Interestingly, both
Summer 2004]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
a preferable approach is to reach the same result under the correct
choice-of-law rule, which will provide sounder precedents.
e. Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga
349
Aguiniga is a wrongful-death claim for a single-car accident in
Mexico that killed Texas residents on vacation there. Plaintiff Jorge
Aguiniga, a car dealer in Houston, bought a 1991 Ford Aerostar van at
auction in Louisiana. He had bought the van for family use, and in
1994, his wife, children, and family friends left on an extended trip
through Texas and Mexico. While traveling in the mountains near
Monterrey, Mexico, the van's brakes and steering failed. The van left
the mountain road and rolled into a ravine, killing all passengers except
the driver, Estehla Aguiniga. 350 The driver and her husband sued Ford
in Houston and won a trial verdict of $16 million. 351 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's application of Texas law, using
interest analysis under the guise of Second Restatement sections 6 and
145, including a finding of a false conflict because only Texas had an
interest in the case.352 The use of interest analysis here probably did
not affect the outcome because the accident location was less of a factor
than the apparent manufacturing defect that could have failed in other
locations.
f In re Estate of Garcia-Chapa
353
This was an estate action to declare heirship in thirty-one bank
accounts in eight Texas banks; the accounts were owned by two sisters
who were Mexican citizens and residents at the time of their death.
3 54
A parallel claim was underway in Mexico, and the Texas case already
had been through two trials, both adjudicated under Texas law.355 The
primary issue in the appeal was what law governed intestate succession
Mitchell and Baird also applied a Currie-type state-interest analysis, as discussed
below. See infra Parts IV.B. 1.c & 2.a.
349. 9 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
350. Id. at 255-56.
351. Id. at 255.
352. Id. at 260-61 (citing Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 422 for the false-conflicts
point).
353. 33 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).




to these accounts. After noting the applicability of the most-
significant-relationship test and quoting Second Restatement section
6,356 the court of appeals briefly recited Texas's interests in not
interrupting foreign disputes over assets located in Texas. The court
cursorily concluded that the Restatement would support the application
of Mexican law.357 The choice-of-law point was moot, however,
because at the second trial (now being appealed), no one had offered
sufficient proof of pertinent Mexican law. The court of appeals
therefore affirmed the trial court's application of Texas law to this
Mexican probate issue.358
It is obvious that the court's short treatment of the choice-of-
law issue was harmless dicta because of the failure to prove pertinent
Mexican law, and it is possible that the court would have done a more
thorough analysis if Mexican probate had been provided. The opinion
is nonetheless flawed in reaching its conclusion based on a few
sentences analyzing nothing but Texas interests (albeit interests
pointing to Mexican law). This outcome was no doubt correct, but it
could have been reached more convincingly. Second Restatement
section 260 provides that succession to intestate property is governed
by the law that would be applied by the state where decedent was
domiciled at the time of death.359 Although the Texas Supreme Court
has not adopted the entire Second Restatement, it can be used as
persuasive authority. Applied here, section 260 would require
application of Mexico's choice-of-law rule to this issue. But with the
failure to prove relevant Mexican law, the result would be the same,
and Texas law would still control by default.
B. The Federal Courts
When applying the Texas choice-of-law rules in diversity cases,
federal courts in the Fifth Circuit are more inclined than Texas state
courts to use a Currie-type interest analysis, using it to some degree in
one out of four cases. Federal courts have applied Texas's most-
significant-relationship test sixty-nine times since Gutierrez, and have
included some aspect of Currie interest analysis in seventeen (24.64%)
356. Id. at 861-62.
357. Id. at 862.
358. In re Estate of Garcia-Chapa, 33 S.W.3d at 862-63.
359. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 260 (1971) ("The devolution
of interests in movables upon intestacy is determined by the law that would be applied
by the courts of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.").
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of those cases.
1. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Fifth Circuit has invoked the most-significant-relationship
test thirty-five times since Gutierrez, and included interest analysis (as
a test, not merely a factor) in the eight cases that follow:
a. Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States
3 6 0
Transco illustrates how the Second Restatement's emphasis on
state-interest analysis in tort cases can be misread as a dispositive
choice-of-law test. The case arose from a 1982 air collision over
Addison, Texas, that destroyed two planes and killed all occupants.
36 1
The collision led to numerous claims, including a Federal Tort Claims
Act suit against the United States for the air traffic controller's
negligence. 362 All other claims were disposed of except the federal tort
claim, which went to trial with judgment going to plaintiffs.363 The
appeal included the United States's challenge to the trial court's
application of Louisiana law to the damages issue. 36 ' The Fifth Circuit
held that: (1) a federal choice-of-law rule applied to FTCA claims; (2)
the rule called for the law of the state of the act or omission (Texas),
including its choice-of-law rule, and (3) Texas used the most-
significant-relationship test.
365
The court then noted that "[a]ccording to the Restatement, the
law of the state with the dominant interest in determining the measure
of damages in a wrongful death action should be applied," mistakenly
citing section 175 comment b.366 The quoted language does not appear
in section 175, but rather, approximates language in section 178
comment b, governing damages, which was the issue in conflict here.
367
Although this comment is consistent with the Second Restatement's
emphasis on state interests in tort cases, 368 it must be read in light of the
360. 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990).
361. Id. at 1439.
362. Id. at 1440.
363. Id. at 1440-41.
364. Id. at 1450.
365. Transco Leasing Corp., 896 F.2d at 1450.
366. Id. (emphasis added).
367. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 178 cmt. b (1971)
(stating that "[i]n general, this should the be the state which has the dominant interest
in the determination of this issue").
368. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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sections to which it pertains, that is, sections 178, 175, 145, and
ultimately section 6. Section 175 applies to "Right of Action for
Death" and calls for the law of the state where the injury occurred,
unless some other state has a greater relationship under the principles
stated in section 6.369 In none of the pertinent black-letter sections is
state interest or dominant interest a dispositive factor. In any event, the
Fifth Circuit took this cue to do a pure interest analysis with no mention
of the accident's situs (Texas), or of the situs presumption explicit in
section 175 and implicit in section 178. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's holding that Louisiana law controlled because Texas
had no interest in the damages issue for Louisiana residents.
370
As with so many other cases discussed in this Article, the
court's choice is supportable but poorly analyzed. Moreover, a better
analysis under sections 6 and 145 would illuminate other considerations
that could have changed the outcome. For example, because the
accident occurred in Texas and was allegedly the fault of the controller,
the United States would have some expectation that errors made in
Texas would be compensated for according to Texas law. Among other
things, this would be the basis for evaluating loss projections and,
although the United States is self-insuring, the principle that a local
party (the air traffic control operation) has some expectation of local
law controlling local mistakes is nonetheless valid.
b. Coakes v. Arabian American Oil Co.
3 7 1
In Coakes, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court'sforum
non conveniens dismissal of an Aramco employee's fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. Coakes was an English citizen who took ajob
with Aramco to work in Saudi Arabia.3 72  The employment
interviewing process occurred in England through Aramco's
369. Second Restatement § 175 states:
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175.
370. Transco Leasing Corp., 896 F.2d at 1451.
371. 831 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1987).
372. Id. at 573.
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Netherlands subsidiary, and had no connection to the United States
other than Aramco's corporate presence in Houston and other U.S.
cities. While on the job in Saudi Arabia, Coakes was arrested and
imprisoned for making alcohol. When released, Coakes and his wife
sued in a Houston federal court, claiming that Aramco affirmatively
represented to Coakes that he could make alcohol while working in
Saudi Arabia.373  Aramco moved for a forum non conveniens
dismissal, 374 one element of which is the governing law.375 The district
court concluded that U.S. law should not govern and granted the
dismissal. 376 Although the Fifth Circuit continued the choice-of-law
analysis from the perspective of whether U.S. law should govern, 377 it
made clear that the Texas choice-of-law rule applied and implicitly held
that these claims would arise under state law and not "United States
law." 378 The court did a quick choice-of-law affirmance, looking only
to a balance of interests between the United States, England, Saudi
Arabia, and apparently the Netherlands. 379  The court did list
contacts--Coakes was a British subject, the contract was made in
England after negotiation under the control of an Aramco subsidiary in
the Netherlands, and the performance was in Saudi Arabia. 380 But
these facts, as in other interest-analysis cases, supported nothing more
than the court's quick estimation of various states' interests.
Ultimately, the court concluded, "[i]n short, the United States has only
a minimal interest in the issues presented in this case. 381
The court did not consider the parties' expectations, contrary to
the Second Restatement's emphasis of that factor in contract cases.382
Applying party interest with a bit of unwarranted speculation (the kind
373. Id. Their claims included fraud, breach of contract, mental anguish, and loss
of consortium.
374. Id.
375. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
376. Coakes, 831 F.2d at 574.
377. Id. The court was, of course, referring to whatever law in the United States
that might apply.
378. Id.
379. Id. The analysis was brief, and the other countries' interests were not
identified. The analysis sought only to eliminate American states from consideration,
rather than to choose the single appropriate governing law.
380. Id.
381. Coakes, 831 F.2d at 574. The United States, as such, had no interest if
government interest is measured by stated policies. Although the court's purpose is
clear, and the result is plausible, any legal or policy analysis that incorrectly
characterizes the policy-maker will increase the likelihood of error.
382. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971).
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courts use for interest analysis), it is likely that Aramco expected that a
British recruit would not be able to rely on Texas law for contract
claims arising either in England or Saudi Arabia. It is also likely that
Aramco's expectation would be more reasonable than any reliance on
Texas law that Coakes might claim. That result would be better
supported under the most-significant-relationship test.
c. Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc.
3 8 3
Mitchell is a Challoner-type action for two Marines' deaths and
another's injury from a defective mortar shell that was manufactured in
Texas and exploded during training at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina. 384 Defendants moved for summary judgment under North
Carolina's six-year statute of repose, which all parties agreed would bar
plaintiffs' claims.385 The trial court ruled that Texas law applied, and,
under that law, plaintiffs won at trial.386 In its affirmance, the Fifth
Circuit did an interest analysis,387 showing stronger evidence of a
Currie approach than some cases because of its careful explanation of a
two-step choice-of-law process: (1) "identify the relevant state
contacts" and (2) "identify the policies or governmental interests of
each state., 388 This language tracks the governmental-interest approach
used, for example, in California.389 The court recited the pertinent
Second Restatement provisions as sections 6 and 145390 and it even
footnoted section 6.391 The court also connected the facts relevant to
section 145: plaintiffs were from Indiana, New Mexico, and Kentucky;
defendants were Maryland and California corporations, both doing
business in Texas; the explosion was in North Carolina; and the
defective shell was completed and placed into the stream of commerce
383. 913 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1990).
384. Id. at 243-44. See also supra note 209 (discussing Day & Zimmerman, Inc.
v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), where the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
use of government-interest analysis to select Texas law for the injury and death of two
American soldiers from a malfunctioning mortar round).
385. Id. at 244, 249 n.13.
386. Id. at 244.
387. Id. at 249-50.
388. Mitchell, 913 F.2d at 249.
389. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (quoting Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976)).
390. Mitchell, 913 F.2d at 249.
391. Id. at 249 n.14.
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in Texas.392  The court's only employment of section 6 was the
comparison of Texas and North Carolina interests, and facts were
included only in regard to the state-interest discussion.393 The court did
not mention section 146 (personal injury) or section 175 (wrongful
death), both having a presumption that the law of the place of the injury
controls unless another state has a more significant relationship.
Mitchell's choice of Texas law is suspect on two points. First, the
court's finding that Texas had a greater interest was partly based on its
conclusion that North Carolina's statute of repose was designed to
protect in-state manufacturers that were not present in Mitchell.
39 4
Mitchell drew its conclusion about the North Carolina legislature's
purpose from a North Carolina case that, in fact, discussed the statute of
repose at length but did not once indicate that its focus was limited to
North Carolina manufacturers. 395 This is a good example of interest
analysts' tendency to assume that foreign legislatures act only in regard
to their own, an idea central to Currie's philosophy.396 Mitchell's
second flaw is that, even if the North Carolina statute was limited to its
own manufacturers, and even if Texas therefore had a greater interest,
Mitchell reached its conclusion to apply Texas law in isolation from
other section-6 factors.
d Albany Insurance Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu
397
Albany was a marine insurer's action seeking a declaration of
nonliability for damage to a shrimping vessel used in Texas waters.
392. Id. at 249.
393. Id. at 249-50.
394. Id. at 249-50 (citing Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67, 74 (N.C.
1985)).
395. Mitchellmisapplied North Carolina's Tetterton decision. In considering the
statute of repose's constitutionality, the North Carolina court stated that it was
"enacted as a part of the products liability act, which was the [North Carolina]
legislature's 'response to the upheaval in products liability law of the 1970's."'
Tetterton, 332 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Terry Morehead Dworkin, Product Liability of
the 1980's: "Repose is Not the Destiny" of Manufacturers, 61 N.C. L. REv. 33, 33
(1982)). None of the Tetterton court's language suggests a focus on North Carolina
manufacturers, and this may be an example of Juenger's point that tort-reform statutes
are more often the result of lobbying by multistate interests, rather than local interests.
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law: How It Ought Not to Be, 48 MERCER L.
REV. 757, 759 (1997).
396. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 37 & n.55.
397. 927 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1991).
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The trial court awarded the boat owner $90,405.398 The insurer's
appeal included an argument that the trial court should have applied
Louisiana law, which would apply a stricter standard than Texas law to
the insured's misstatements of fact in her insurance application. 399 The
Fifth Circuit's double choice-of-law analysis first considered whether
state or federal law governed the interpretation of the insurance policy,
and when federal law was eliminated in a lengthy discussion,4 °° the
second question was which state's law governed. That decision was
also a matter of federal law,40 1 one that required another lengthy
discussion because of the ambiguity in the federal choice-of-law rule.40 2
The court clarified that the federal choice-of-law rule for maritime-
insurance issues was interest analysis, but, in doing so, it compared that
rule's function to the Second Restatement's approach, which it
described for contract cases as looking to contacts initially, then to state
403interests. Under this analysis, the court chose Texas law over
Louisiana' S404 and affurmed the trial court's judgment.40 5 Although this
was a maritime case governed by a federal choice-of-law rule, it reveals
the court's misunderstanding of the Second Restatement and the most-
significant-relationship test, which it characterized as substantially
similar to government-interest analysis.
e. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co.
4 0 6
Billy Kirk Pruitt left a good job in California for what he
thought was a better one in Dallas. California-based Levi Strauss had
recruited Pruitt as a salesman for its new Tops division, and, according
to Pruitt, promised him "employment for as long as he performed
satisfactorily. ' ,4°7 Things went well for a time, and after five months
the company promoted Pruitt to regional sales manager. But projected
sales did not materialize, and in spite of Levi's cash infusion, the
398. Id. at 885-86.
399. Id. at 890 n.8.
400. Id. at 886-90.
401. Id. at 890 (citing Gonzalez v. NavieraNeptuno, A.A., 832 F.2d 876,880 n.3
(5th Cir. 1987)).
402. Albany, 927 F.2d at 890-91.
403. Id. at 891.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 895.
406. 932 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by, Floors
Unlimited, Inc. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 55 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 1995).
407. Id. at 460.
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division lost $15 million in three years and had to be closed.4°8 All
employees were fired, including Pruitt, who sued under California's
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for employment contracts.40 9
The federal court in Dallas refused to apply California law and entered
410summary judgment for Levi Strauss. In upholding the summary
judgment, the Fifth Circuit correctly invoked Second Restatement
section 196's presumption that service contracts are governed by the
law where the majority of services are to be performed I.4 1 The court
also noted section 196's second component-that the presumption is
overcome if another state has a more significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties.41 2 At this point, the court should have
followed the DeSantis model (which it cited three times 413) and
considered all seven factors in section 6. Instead it considered only
state interests, prefaced with this statement: "In effect, the most
significant relationship approach examines the relative interests of the
states sharing a relationship with the transaction and the parties.
'A14
That it does, along with five other factors including the parties'
expectations.41 5 Unlike Coakes, where a British plaintiff's expectations
of Texas law governing his contract probably would not have been
416reasonable, it was reasonable for Pruitt to anticipate California law
governing his contract, made in California by two parties from
California.41 7 Without the pertinent facts available at this point, it is
impossible to estimate whether Pruitt's expectation would overcome
section 196's presumption that the site of performance governs. If,
however, the issue were characterized as relating to the contract's
formation and not to a performance issue, the section 196 presumption
would disappear and Pruitt's expectations would become an even
stronger factor.418 In any event, these matters might have been
408. Id.
409. Texas has no such requirement for service contracts. Id.
410. Id.
411. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 461 & n.2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 and citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670,
679 (Tex. 1990)).
412. Id. at 461.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See infra note 418.
416. See supra Part IV.B. 1.b.
417. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 460.
418. For example, Second Restatement section 205 governs the nature and extent
of contractual obligations and includes parol evidence issues. RESTATEMENT
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considered if the court had analyzed all of section 6's factors.
f Huddy v. Fruehauf Corp.419
Texas resident Huddy was injured when his truck overturned in
Georgia. He was employed by a Tennessee corporation, and the trip
was from Texas to Georgia.420  Huddy sued truck manufacturer
Fruehauf, a Michigan-based corporation. The case was tried to a
federal magistrate judge who ruled that Michigan law-which does not
recognize strict liability-governed. 421 Fruehauf won the negligence
case, and Huddy appealed the jury's failure to consider his strict
liability claim under Texas law.422
In noting the conflict between Michigan and Texas law, the
Fifth Circuit signaled its interest-analysis approach in this sentence: "In
fact, of all the states that have even a slight interest in this case,
Michigan appears to be the only one which would not recognize
Huddy's theory [of strict liability]. 42 3 The court of appeals reversed
the lower court, and specifically held that the magistrate judge had
erred in concluding that plaintiff's move to New Jersey three years after
the accident negated Texas's interest in the case.424 In so holding, the
court cited section 145's Introductory Notes, indicating that residence
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 205 & cmt. e (1971). Section 205 provides that
the law governing questions such as parol evidence will be determined by section 188
(if the parties have not chosen a law). Section 188 is the general contract principle,
listing five contact factors: (a) place of contracting; (b) place of negotiation; (c) place
of performance; (d) location of the subject matter; and (e) domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. Id. § 188.
Without the presumption favoring the place of performance, California interests are
more evenly balanced. For this analysis, party expectation, which is also one of the
seven policy factors under section 6, is especially important. See id. § 188 cmt. b
(recognizing that of the policy factors outlined in section 6, party expectations is
especially important in contract cases; although it would be less so in tort claims). On
the other hand, section 196 comment a provides that the performance situs's law
governs "the circumstances under which either party may terminate the contract," thus
returning to the presumption favoring Texas law. Id. § 196. Pruitt is an especially
difficult choice-of-law case in which characterization is a crucial issue. Were the
promises made at the time of employment essential terms governing the obligations,
or simply grounds for termination?
419. 953 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
420. Id. at 956.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 956-57.
424. Huddy, 953 F.2d at 957.
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changes after the suit is filed should seldom affect the choice-of-law
decision.425 The ensuing analysis heavily favored state interests but did
examine the contacts under section 145, distinct from the interest
analysis. In particular, the court noted the presumption that the
accident situs's law controls and found that the presumption was of
little value here because Fruehauf s failure could have occurred
anywhere.426 Again, however, the court concluded this point by stating
that "the location of the wreck was fortuitous and that Georgia has no
other interest in this case" and "Georgia's interest in this case does not
appear compelling. 'A27 This statement is somewhat justified by the
comments to section 145, which emphasize state interest as a
compelling factor in tort cases.428 Nonetheless, other factors are also
important, 429 and none of the section-6 policies is summarily eliminated
in tort claims. 430 The issue did not matter anyway because of Georgia
law's consistency with Texas law. 43 1 The court continued its section
145 contact analysis, and, finding the place of manufacture
indeterminate and both Texas and Michigan being residences of
432parties, the court returned to underlying state interests. It concluded
that the Texas interest in using strict liability to protect its residents
outweighed Michigan's rejection of strict liability.
433
425. Id. at 957 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145
introductory notes; Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 601-02 (5th Cir.
1981)).
426. Id. at 957.
427. Id.
428. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmts. b, c, e. See
also supra note 286 and accompanying text.
429. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. b
(explaining that in tort cases, the section-6 factors of (d) justified expectations and (f)
certainty/predictability/uniformity of results are less important because lawyers and
clients tend not to consider tortious conduct ahead of time). (The Second Restatement
was finalized in 1972, prior to the collapse of Enron.) Assuming greater importance
in tort cases are the following section-6 factors: (a) the needs of the interstate and
international system, (b) & (c) the policies of the forum state and other interested
states, and (g) ease in determination and application of the law. Id.
430. Id. § 145(1) (directing that choice of law for tort claims is determined by the
state having "the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under
the principles stated in section 6"). Although the comments to section 145 emphasize
some factors over others for tort claims, nothing in section 145 eliminates any of
section 6's factors. See infra text accompanying note 499 (citing section-6 factors as
justification for their choice-of-law decision).
431. Huddy, 953 F.2d at 957.
432. Id. at 957-58.
433. Id. at 958.
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It is difficult to find fault with this conclusion. The fact that the
court omitted some section-6 factors from the analysis is of little import
because the absent factors would not have mattered. Ease in
application of the law is irrelevant here, and the needs of the interstate
and international system have little impact on a straightforward choice
between Texas's strict-liability remedy and Michigan's lack of one.
Certainty, predictability, and uniformity also have little importance
here. One missing factor might have reinforced the conclusion. Section
6's factor (e)-the basic policies underlying the field of law-had
relevance in that strict liability is an almost-pervasive remedy and was
used by all relevant states but Michigan in this case.434 The court noted
that fact, but it did not note that factor. Although the addition of this
component would not have changed the result, the court could have
followed Texas law and the most-significant-relationship test for torts
by adding a paragraph no longer than this one, merely itemizing and
eliminating the additional factors in section 6.
g. DeAguilar v. Boeing Co.
4 3 5
DeAguilar involved an interesting and perhaps unique choice-
of-law application to removal jurisdiction and the determination of
federal jurisdictional amount. Following the 1986 crash of a Mexicana
Airlines jet near Mexico City, the victims' relatives and personal
representatives filed a number of lawsuits in various forums in the
United States, all of which were dismissed either voluntarily by
plaintiffs, on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity, or forforum non
conveniens.4 36 According to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs were
"determined to find a United States forum in which to try their case.
' 4 37
In the instant case, plaintiffs sought a Texas state court because
of Texas's nonrecognition offorum non conveniens in wrongful death
cases (later legislatively overruled) that might permit litigation in the
United States. Defendant Boeing, on the other hand, wanted a federal
forum, hoping to obtain another forum non conveniens dismissal.
Plaintiffs' state-court petition had alleged unspecified damages in
excess of the state court's $500 jurisdictional threshold, and when
defendant removed, a lengthy battle began over whether the damages
434. Id. at 956-57, 957 n.1.
435. 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995).
436. Id. at 1406.
437. Id.
Summer 2004]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
for each plaintiff exceeded the then-requisite $50,000.01. Through
several district- and appellate-court rulings, the issue eventually
narrowed to whether certain party and estate representatives had
authority to file a stipulation, binding on all parties, limiting damages to
$50,000 or less. To support their position, plaintiffs argued that
Mexican law governed the issue of authority to stipulate to damages.
This is not to say that plaintiffs conceded that Mexican law governed
the tort claims-only that it governed this estate-administration
438issue. To determine governing law, the court did as so many
others have in the cases reviewed here-it noted that a federal court
considering a diversity case was bound by the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which it sat, correctly identified the Texas choice-of-law
rule as the most-significant-relationship test, quoted the pertinent
Second Restatement sections, and then ignored them and limited its
analysis to a comparison of government interests. 439 As with several
other cases using interest analysis, the court recited pertinent facts but
limited their application to interest analysis.
Then the court went a step beyond and made a debatable finding
that the issue of who had authority to bind the Mexican parties and
estates was not one of estate administration, but one akin to the
"procedural" aspects of a case.440 The court placed the term procedure
in quotes to emphasize the accompanying footnote that stated: "Strictly
speaking, this is not a procedural issue: otherwise, the federal
procedural rules would apply."
441
This akin-to-procedure characterization led to the court's
finding that "Mexico has no underlying interest in the application of its
law to determine who can bring a cause of action or bind the estate in a
438. Id. at 1414.
439. Id. at 1413-15.
440. DeAguilar, 47 F.3d 1404, 1414. In support of this point, the court also
found that the accident's situs in Mexico was fortuitous and irrelevant to this issue.
Although the crash site often is found to be fortuitous in airplane- and even auto-crash
cases, the court misstates the issue here. For estate-administration purposes, an
important if not controlling issue is the decedents' nationality or residence. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 314(a) cmt. e (noting the
importance of the decedent's domicile in probate matters).
441. The court did not cite authority for the line it drew here. The court is
incorrect on several points in this analysis. One is that if this issue were deemed
procedural, it does not follow that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would control.
For one thing, the Federal Rules do not address this issue. Under those
circumstances, federal law would, no doubt, turn to state law for the answer, bringing
the analysis full circle.
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Texas cause of action." 4 2 Texas, however, did have an interest, and
thus, controlled the issue. The court deviated from interest analysis for
a one-sentence point that applying Texas law would promote
uniformity and predictability, alluding to but not citing Second
Restatement section 6(2)(f). But it returned to the Currie fold with a
relish by concluding that "[t]his is a false conflict, and Texas law
applies. 443
In tort cases, governmental interests are stronger than in some
actions. But the issue was not tort; it was authority to bind the estates
to a damage stipulation. Mexico had strong interests in a properly
characterized analysis that were not addressed here. On the other hand,
good reasons exist for rejecting plaintiffs' assurances of a $50,000
damage cap per party. Parallel claims were underway in Mexico and
possibly to be filed in other American states. It is understandable that
the court would want impeccable assurances of the damages cap
because a finding for plaintiffs on this issue would cause remand to
state court and thus create a Texas forum in which a forum non
conveniens motion was not possible. Deciding this issue under
Mexican law, a crucial holding not binding on Mexican courts, could
place defendants at an unacceptable risk of multiple judgments. The
factors in section 6 adequately address these problems.4 " One
approach, then, would have been to note Mexico's interest in the estate-
administration issue but find that Texas law controlled in light of other
section-6 factors. This balance addresses important issues of: (1)
442. DeAguilar, 47 F.3d at 1414.
443. Id. at 1414 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 422
(Tex. 1984)). The false conflict point leading to a finding that Mexico had no interest,
and then immediately to a holding that Texas law applied is a prime example of Currie
interest analysis. See supra note 89 and accompanying text for the Currie analysis
steps. See also SCOLES, supra note 3, at 27-30.
444. The Second Restatement also includes sections addressing probate and
estate administration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 236-43
(real property); id. §§ 260-66 (movables). However, no sections address the specific
issue here of authority to bind the estate. In this circumstance, the issue would default
to section 222 (the general property principle), which provides that "interests of the
parties in a thing are determined, depending upon the circumstances, either by the
'law' or by the 'local law' of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has
the most significant relationship to the thing and the parties under the principles stated
in § 6." Id. § 222. The law/local law distinction refers to instances where a court
should apply another jurisdiction's entire law, including its choice-of-law rule. See,
e.g., id. § 223 (governing the validity and effect of real property conveyances, and
calling for the whole law of the land's situs, including its choice-of-law rule). See
also id. §§ 4, 223 cmt. b (discussing renvoi).
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avoiding multiple damages and (2) allowing defendants a hearing on
forum non conveniens by allowing the action to remain in federal court.
All seven factors in section 6 promote one or both of these policies
44 5
and would have reached the same result more convincingly.
h. In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air
Base, Germany
446
This case involved a group of wrongful-death and personal-
injury claims from the crash of an Air Force C-5A in Germany.
Defendants included Lockheed Corporation (Delaware incorporated
and Georgia based) and General Electric Corporation (New York
incorporated and based)." 7 Much of the design and installation work
was done in Georgia, and the plane was based in San Antonio.
44 8
Plaintiffs from Texas, Florida, Kansas, Missouri, and North Dakota
filed seven lawsuits in state courts in Florida and Texas.44 9 Defendants
removed all suits to federal court, and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred them to the Western District of
Texas. The trial court ruled that Georgia law governed, resulting in
summary judgment for the defendants.45 °
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the choice of Georgia law in a brief
analysis-perhaps too brief, considering the severe result of eliminating
plaintiffs' claims by summary judgment.451 In setting up the analysis,
the court observed that under Texas choice-of-law rules, 452 Second
445. Specifically, applying Texas law to determine authority to stipulate to
damages in this case promoted: (1) the needs of the interstate and international
systems in an air crash case; (2) Texas policies; (3) policies of other states having
connections to this matter; (4) defendants' justified expectations that they will not be
subject to multiple judgments; (5) the basic policies underlying air crash cases, that is,
avoiding multiple judgments and addressing forum non conveniens issues; (6)
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and (7) ease in applying Texas law
instead of Mexican law on an apparently difficult issue.
446. 81 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 1996), amended by, Perez v. Lockheed Corp., 88 F.3d
340 (5th Cir. 1996).
447. Id. at 572 nn.2-3.
448. Id. at 572.
449. Id. at 572 & n.4.
450. Id. at 573 nn.5-6 (noting that the summary-judgment issues included
Georgia law-not having a duty to warn of obvious design defects-and Georgia's
ten-year statute of repose).
451. See generally In re Air Disaster, 81 F.3d at 576-77 (determining which
choice-of-law rules to apply and affirming the district court's choice of Georgia law).
452. This was a multidistrict-transfer case under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. As such, the
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Restatement sections 6 and 145 applied, with section 6 containing the
general principles, "whereas Restatement Section 145 lists the factual
matters to be considered when applying the Section 6 principles to a
given case. ' ,453 After establishing this thorough and accurate predicate,
the court quickly disposed of the issue by finding that: (1) the place of
the injury was fortuitous; 454 (2) the victims' residences did not
matter; 455 and (3) the important contact was the place of design and
manufacture.456 To complete this hasty run through the factors, the
court cited what it deemed the only relevant contact-the design and
manufacturing activities in Georgiaa57-and then connected that
directly to state-interest analysis. Specifically, the court stated:
"Virtually all of the relevant conduct complained of took place in
Georgia, with some possible activity by General Electric in Ohio.
Georgia thus has the strongest interest in applying its law to businesses
that design, manufacture and sell products into its stream of
commerce. ' '458 This analysis, though feasible, is weak on two points.
First, it short-circuits the most-significant-relationship test by hastily
eliminating all states but Georgia, based on findings supportable by the
court had to consider which choice-of-law rule to apply. Federal law requires that the
transferee court apply individually the choice-of-law rules of each of the transferor
courts. Id. at 576 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)). All the cases
came from Florida and Texas, which both use the Second Restatement's most-
significant-relationship test. Thus, that was the applicable choice-of-law rule. See id.
at 576-77 (citing Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312,318 (Tex. 1979) and Bishop v.
Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980)).
453. Id. at 577 (citing Crisman v. Cooper Indus., 748 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied)).
454. The alleged cause here was product failure; thus making the German
accident site fortuitous, as the court found. But the court's statement could be read to
say that accident sites in general are irrelevant in tort cases, and this is simply wrong.
Contrary to the court's discussion, the Restatement advises that the accident site is a
primary consideration, except where the occurrence is fortuitous. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. e (discussing situations "where the place
of injury will not play an important role in the selection of the state of the applicable
law").
455. Similar to the point made in the prior footnote, this case should not be read
to mean that victims' or parties' residences, citizenships, or nationalities are irrelevant
to tort claims. They are strong factors, as specifically stated in section 145(2)(c) and
discussed further in section 145 comment e. Id. §§ 145(2)(c), 145 cmt. e.
456. In re Air Disaster, 81 F.3d at 577 (citing Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d
1278, 1282-83 (11 th Cir. 1985)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
145 cmt. e.
457. In re Air Disaster, 81 F.3d at 577.
458. Id. (emphasis added).
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Second Restatement's comments but ignoring a more thorough reading
of those comments. Second, the court appears to make a one-to-one
connection between the one contact it finds significant (the place of
design and manufacture), and the one policy factor (interest analysis) it
finds significant. The Georgia contact is pertinent under section 145,
but it is to be considered in light of all seven section-6 factors, as the
court noted on the same page.459 Although brief choice-of-law analyses
often are adequate, the ones barring a plaintiff's claim should apply a
more thorough test. In the Ramstein analysis, section 145 clearly
directs a final step under section 6's seven-factor test, of which the
court considered only state interest.
2. Texas Federal District Courts
Federal district courts in Texas (including bankruptcy and
magistrate courts) use some aspect of interest analysis more often than
any other judicial category reported in this Article, doing so in nine of
their thirty-four (26.47%) applications of the most-significant-
relationship test since Gutierrez v. Collins in 1979. This percentage is
inflated because of the federal district courts' greater tendency to use
Currie vocabulary even in cases not otherwise overdone with interest
analysis. Such cases tend to count contacts and then label the
conclusion as "state X having a greater interest" rather than doing a
proper Second Restatement analysis.46 °
a. Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron
461
Baird is so thoroughly analyzed under Second Restatement
principles that it hardly belongs here, except for its express use of the
Currie false-conflicts approach. Baird was a Canadian citizen who was
severely injured while flying a Bell helicopter in Surinam.462 Baird and
his wife brought several claims against Bell, who asked that Canadian
law be applied both to the plaintiffs' claims and to Bell's third-party-
459. Id. at 577 n.9.
460. See, e.g., Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex.
1985), rev'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussed infra Part IV.B.2.b); Hefner v.
Republic Indem. Co. of Am., 773 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (discussed infra
Part III.B.2.g).
461. 491 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
462. Id. at 1132.
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contribution claims.463 The court had to determine the applicable law
for five issues: basic liability (the Canadian remedy was limited to
negligence); 464 Bell's third-party-contribution claims (the liability
apportionment differed); 465 Baird's pecuniary damages (there was no
conflict); 466 Baird's nonpecuniary damages (Canada capped them at
$100,000);467 and Baird's wife's loss-of-consortium claims (the court
ordered plaintiffs to provide additional evidence of pertinent Canadian
law).468 The court considered these issues only months after the
469Gutierrez decision. It did a textbook analysis leading to Texas law
for (1) liability, (2) Bell's third-party claims, and (3) Baird's pecuniary
470losses. It looked to Canadian law for (4) Baird's pain and suffering
and (5) his wife's claims. 471 The only misstep is a concluding point in
the liability section that "[t]he analysis so clearly mandates the use of
Texas products liability law that this issue very nearly represents a false
conflict., 472 This language clearly refers to Currie's concept of false
conflicts-the court already had concluded that British Columbia's
interest in protecting its citizens by limiting the remedy to negligence
and noted that this interest would not be served in regard to non-
Canadian-resident Bell.473 This conclusion apparently was speculation,
given the court's statement that "[a]n evident policy of British
Columbia is to protect its citizen manufacturers . . . . 474 British
Columbia's purpose could just as easily have been an outright rejection
of the theory of personal-injury recovery without proof of negligence,
463. Id. at 1140, 1142, 1148. It is unclear whether Bell asked for Canadian law
for the loss-of-consortium claims. Id. at 1152. No party asked for the law of Surinam.
Id. at 1139. The court noted the Second Restatement's emphasis on situs law in tort
claims, and it further explained that the presumption is overcome where the accident
location was fortuitous. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
145 cmt. e).
464. Baird, 491 F. Supp. at 1140-42.
465. Id. at 1142-48.
466. Id. at 1148-49.
467. Id. at 1149-52.
468. Id. at 1152.
469. Baird, 491 F. Supp. at 1147.
470. Id. at 1142, 1148-49.
471. Id. at 1152.
472. Id. at 1141 (citing DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 89
(1965)).
473. Id.
474. Baird, 491 F. Supp. at 1141 (emphasis added). The opinion does not
provide any other support for this conclusion about British Columbia's policy on
personal-injury remedies.
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which would include Bell and all other manufacturers. The court's
conclusions were very well supported without this point, and this
dictum foray into Currie interest analysis does not affect the validity of
an otherwise very well reasoned opinion.
b. Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.475
Faloona is a very well-analyzed invasion-of-privacy suit,
except for its choice-of-law analysis.476 The plaintiffs were two
children suing through their mother for the unauthorized reprinting of
nude pictures sold to Hustler Magazine without the mother's specific
permission. In selecting the applicable law, the court bifurcated the
distinct issue of plaintiffs' claims for invasion of privacy (a tort) and
Hustler's affirmative defense of a release (a contract issue).477 The
choice-of-law discussion's introductory sentence signals the influence
of interest analysis in this case: "Both California and Texas have some
interest as to each issue. ',478 For the right-of-privacy claim, the court
concluded that the other states' contacts were insufficient to displace
the Restatement's emphasis on Texas as the plaintiffs' domicile at the
time of publication.479 Although the court did not take the next step of
considering any offsetting factors under section 6, this conclusion is
almost certainly correct. In any event, it is not an overuse of interest
analysis but an underuse, and it is not the subject of this Article.
Turning to the validity of the mother's release, the court took a
475. 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986).
476. Faloona has superior reasoning in a case where a mother agreed to the
publication of nude pictures of her five- and seven-year-old children in The SexAtlas,
a book containing erotic and sexually explicit depictions of group sex, sado-
masochism, pederasty, bestiality, and other activities. When her children's pictures
were reprinted in Hustler, the mother and children objected to them as pornographic.
Although a quick description of these facts might suggest the frivolity of this claim,
the issues were more complicated. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, the court
concluded that taking the plaintiffs' testimony at face value (their disgust at Hustler),
their real goal should not be damages but censorship. Id. at 1360-61. The resulting
dismissal flows from a quote from Clare Boothe Luce: "Censorship, 'like charity,
should begin at home; but unlike charity, it should end there."' Id. at 1361.
477. Id. at 1352.
478. Id.
479. Faloona, 607 F. Supp. at 1352. Second Restatement section 153 provides
that multistate invasion-of-privacy claims are subject to the most-significant-
relationship test, but that the chosen state will "usually be the state where the plaintiff
was domiciled at the time if the matter complained of was published in that state."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 153 (1971).
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government-interest approach. The court first selected the plaintiffs'
domicile as the primary contact under Second Restatement section 188:
"Therefore, although the place of contracting, the location of the
subject matter of the contract, and the reasonable expectations of the
parties are to be considered, substantial weight must be given to the
domicile of the plaintiffs and their parents' '480 Listing the plaintiffs'
and parents' contacts with Texas, the court found that "[t]hese close
ties with Texas give this state a very strong interest in governing the
relationship between the plaintiffs and their parents. ' 48" Then,
contrasting California's equally strong contacts, the court concluded
that "California's interests concerning the validity of the release is not
as strong as that of Texas-so Texas law will also govern the release
issue. 482
Faloona thus shows the influence of an interest-analysis
approach. Its opening sentence foreshadowing the conclusion to apply
Texas law was termed only in interest analysis, 483 and its discussion of
the mother's release summarized the contacts in terms of interest
analysis. Faloona may be an example of nothing more than
vocabulary-that is, a tendency to use the term interest to mean the
state having the strongest contacts or having the most significant
relationship. If so, it is also an example of how the area of conflict of
laws has defined some of its terms poorly, leading to differing
484applications in the courts and calling for a revamping of vocabulary.
c. Tidelands Royalty B Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp.485
480. Faloona, 607 F. Supp. at 1353 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188).
481. Id.
482. Id. The court also found that the release was binding under both Texas and
California law. Id. at 1353 n.35. The ensuing discussion of the validity of the release
may be found at pages 1353-55. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed on this
point only, finding that California law would control because of the children's later
presence there, the granting of the mother's divorce there, and her custody of the
children there. Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir.
1986). The point was moot, however, because the appellate court affirmed the district
court's conclusion that no invasion of privacy had occurred. Id. at 1007.
483. See supra text accompanying note 478.
484. See generally supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting Professor Juenger
and implying the pervasiveness of Currie's influence on conflicts vocabulary and
suggesting the need to coin new terms).
485. 611 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
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This claim arose from the wrongful drainage of gas by adjacent
leaseholds in submerged property off the coasts of southwest Louisiana
and southeast Texas. Federal law provided a choice-of-law rule-
specifically, that such disputes be governed by the law of the adjacent
state, further defined as applying to offshore areas "which would be
within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to
the outer margin of the Outer Continental Shelf. 4 86 The court found
that this pointed to Louisiana law,487 but shored up its analysis by
showing that, if the federal choice-of-law rule did not control,
Louisiana law nonetheless would govern. Although the Texas choice-
of-law rule would control because the federal court sat there, the court
noted that Louisiana also used the Second Restatement approach.488
Having noted the Restatement's applicability in both states, the court
did not apply any of its sections, and instead conducted a pure interest
analysis leading to Louisiana law.489
d Abston v. Levi Strauss & CO.
4 9 0
Abston involved a federal claim for age discrimination with
pendent state-law claims for breach of contract and intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 491 The plaintiff was a Texas-
based salesman for a California company who argued for California
law for his contract claim and for Texas law for his emotional-distress
claim; the defendant wanted Texas law for both claims.492 In choosing
Texas law for both claims, the court first rejected the use of Second
Restatement section 196, which governs contracts for services, because,
according to the court, the Texas Supreme Court had adopted only
section 6, and no Texas cases had used section 196. The court
486. Id. at 799 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
485-86 (1981) (citing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1333(A)(2) (1976))).
487. Id. at 800.
488. Id. (citing Lee v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Wickham v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 366 So. 2d 951 (La. App. 1978)).
489. Id.
490. 684 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
491. Id. at 153.
492. Id. at 154.
493. Id. at 154. The Texas Supreme Court later invoked section 196 in De Santis
v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 679 n.4 (Tex. 1990), and it was used again in
two federal cases. See Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458,461 (5th Cir. 1991)
("In cases involving contracts for the rendition of services, the Texas Supreme Court
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offered a one-paragraph analysis using four of section 6's seven
factors-the forum state's interests, California's interests, outcome
predictability, and party expectation.494 This short analysis seems to
resolve the question fairly, and Abston would not make this list except
for two points.
The first is a sentence characterizing section 6 as favoring
interest analysis in contract cases: "Most important here are the
relevant policies of the forum state and of other states alleged to have
an interest in the application of their law to the case. ' 495 Under the
most-significant-relationship test, state interests are always a possible
factor. But Abston was a contracts case, and the "[p]rotection of the
justified expectations of the parties is the basic policy underlying the
field of contracts. 496  The court did expressly consider party
expectation, and that is the second point of contention-it did so in a
short-handed conclusion that "it can hardly be said that a party who has
lived and worked in Texas for eleven years, and has brought suit here,
would be unfairly surprised to have Texas law apply to him."497 The
issue here, of course, is not whether a party would be surprised that a
Texas court would generally apply Texas law, but whether the
contracting parties expected Texas law to apply to their contract.
Because the contract was for services in Texas, and because plaintiffs
did not negotiate in California and were not recruited from there, they
should have expected Texas law to govern. But the court's conclusion
is based, as worded, on two factors-plaintiff's Texas residence, and
plaintiff's decision to file his lawsuit in Texas. The unilateral residence
of one contracting party, though relevant, is insufficient to indicate the
parties' expectations as to governing law. The second factor-filing
suit in Texas-is irrelevant to the contracting parties' expectations.498
has particularly relied on section 196 of the Restatement."); Perez v. Alcoa Fujikura,
Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 991, 1003 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (applying section 196 of the
Restatement).
494. Abston, 684 F. Supp. at 154-55.
495. Id. at 154.
496. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971).
497. Abston, 684 F. Supp. at 155.
498. Id.; see supra Part IV.A. 1.b (discussing Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46
S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 2000)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
6 cmt. e (pointing out that, where the forum state has no interest in the case other than
being the forum, its only relevant policies will be "embodied in its rules relating to
trial administration"). Currie, on the other hand, believed that the forum always had
an interest in applying its own law, a point echoed by current interest analysts. See
CURRIE, supra note 13, at 60-62. See also, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80
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Thus, these additional section-6 factors-party expectation and
outcome predictability-were considered only in a short-handed
fashion that left interest analysis the only real test here.499
e. Adams v. Gates Learjet Corp.
50
Adams contains a very brief choice-of-law analysis based on the
obviously correct conclusion that Kansas law should govern this claim
for reimbursement of aircraft modification costs. The opinion is
interlocutory, merely determining that Kansas law controls and
ordering plaintiffs to submit new responses to defendant's summary-
judgment motion, this time premised on Kansas law.50 1 Some or all of
the plaintiffs were owners of a Learjet, which, after purchase, required
modification to meet federal airworthiness standards.50 2 Plaintiffs were
from Texas, Missouri, Colorado, Oklahoma, Nevada, Florida,
Michigan, and Oregon, and only three of the twelve plaintiffs resided in
Texas.50 3 Defendant Gates Learjet was a Kansas corporation, the plane
was built and the modifications were made in Kansas, and the federal
order came from a Kansas FAA office.504 Moreover, plaintiff Tri City
had a purchase agreement with Gates Learjet containing a Kansas
choice-of-law clause.50 5 The apparent purpose of the Texas forum was
plaintiffs' pursuit of a claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.5 °6
Noting Kansas's overwhelming contacts and Texas's relative
lack of any contracts, the court then quoted what appeared to be the
ratio decidendi: "As Judge Bue recognized in Continental Oil
GEO. L.J. 53, 94 (1991) (opining that when a court's sovereign interest is invoked
there is no substitute for its taking "unilateral responsibility for the enforcement of the
law"). Critics continue to argue against the forum preference. E.g., Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 311 (1992) (arguing that the elimination of
forum preference altogether is the only constitutional solution to violations of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause).
499. Abston, 684 F. Supp. at 155.
500. 711 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
501. Id. at 1375-76 (discussing choice-of-law and new summary-judgment
response briefs, and dismissing various claims under Texas law and the counterclaim
against a bankrupt plaintiff).
502. Id. at 1375.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 1375 n.1.
505. Adams, 711 F. Supp. at 1375 (binding only Tri City with the clause).
506. Id. at 1375-76.
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Company v. General American Transportation Corporation, the state in
which a defendant manufacturer is located 'has a significant interest in
determining the liability of in-state manufacturers and, accordingly,
controlling defendant's conduct."' 50 7 This in turn led to the conclusion
that "Kansas has the most significant relationship to the merits of this
controversy., 50 8 Following that conclusion the court explained: "The
application of Kansas law will ensure 'certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result' in this case., 50 9 The result is correct without a
doubt, but the only stated rule in reaching that result was interest
analysis, with an after-reference to an additional section-6 factor.
f In re Chanel Financial, Inc.
510
Continental Casualty Company asked a Dallas bankruptcy court
to impose a constructive trust on Cosmopolitan Credit and Investment
Corporation, later known as Chanel Financial, Inc., based on the latter's
fraud.511 Three choice-of-law questions arose. The first was whether
the constructive trust issue was substantive or remedial. The court
began with an outdated quote: "The general conflict of laws rule in
Texas is that 'questions of substantive law are controlled by the state
where the cause of action arose, but ... matters of remedy and of
procedure are governed by the law of the state where the action is
sought to be maintained.' ' 512 The court then noted that Duncan had
507. Id. at 1375 (quoting Cont'l Oil Co. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp.
288, 296 (S.D. Tex. 1976)).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 1375 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6
(1971)).
510. 102 B.R. 549 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
511. Id. at 551.
512. Id. at 550 (quoting Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024,1027 (5th Cir.
1984); California v. Copus, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230 (1958)). Contrary to Chanel's
present-tense usage, this statement of Texas law was wrong at the time and wrong
when Morris was published on March 2, 1984, following Duncan's February 15, 1984
issuance. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. 1984)
(holding that an insurance release had to be construed according to Texas law because
Texas had the most significant relationship to the issue). The Fifth Circuit's
misstatement of the Texas conflicts rule in Morris is to be expected because of its
proximity to Duncan's issuance, but Chanel's misstatement is not. Chanel's point, of
course, is that the Texas Supreme Court had not changed the conflicts rule regarding
forum procedure; although forum law no doubt controls procedural issues in the vast
majority of cases, it is not at all clear that conflicts involving procedure are immune
from Duncan and the most-significant-relationship test. See infra note 513. See also
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overruled this approach in 1984, but that, since then, "the reported
authorities have neither overruled nor questioned the vitality of Morris"
for its proposition that remedies are governed by forum law. 513 The
court then characterized the imposition of a constructive trust as a
remedy; thus, it was governed by Texas law.514
The second choice-of-law issue was which law governed fraud,
a predicate to imposing the constructive trust.515 Here the court began
with the presumption under Second Restatement section 148 that "if the
plaintiff's action in reliance took place in the same state where the false
representations were made," that state's law controls unless another
state has a more significant relationship to the issue.516 The court found
that all pertinent acts-the plaintiff s and the defendant's-occurred in
Louisiana, whose law would control unless another state had a more
significant relationship. 517 This determination should have been tested
not just by contacts but also by the seven factors in section 6. Instead,
the court noted several Louisiana contacts 518 and then reached a quick
conclusion that "[w]hile both Texas and Louisiana have significant
state interests in protecting its [sic] residents from fraud, the facts do
not justify the conclusion that Texas has an overriding state interest in
protecting CCC to overcome the presumption."519 This analysis thus
follows a pattern found in many other cases in this Article of pairing
contacts with a summary interest-analysis conclusion. The third
choice-of-law issue-the res's traceability-was not analyzed under the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122-44 (governing choice of law
for procedural issues and illustrating instances in which procedural issues would be
governed by non-forum law).
513. In re Chanel Fin., Inc., 102 B.R. at 550. Although the Texas Supreme
Court has not broadly addressed choice-of-law questions regarding remedies and
procedure, it has applied the most-significant-relationship test in at least two
instances, both after Chanel, that may give insight. See generally Ford Motor Co. v.
Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1995) (applying the test to evidentiary privilege);
Hughes Wood Prods. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000) (discussing the
exclusivity of Louisiana's workers' compensation remedy).
514. In re Chanel Fin., Inc., 102 B.R. at 550.
515. Id. at 551.
516. Id. (citing Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 659 F. Supp. 611, 616
(D.D.C. 1987) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(1))).
517. Id.
518. Id. The opinion failed to identify any Texas contacts pertaining to fraud,
and simply concluded they were insufficient. Also missing is any information
regarding the parties' residences, places of business, or states of incorporation.
519. In re Chanel Fin., Inc., 102 B.R. at 551.
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most-significant-relationship test, and is thus not pertinent here.520
g. Hefner v. Republic Indemnity Co. of
America
521
Hefner, ironically, lacks any real interest analysis and could
have used some as part of a proper Second Restatement analysis.
Nonetheless, it is included here as a good example of a case equating
contact counting with state interest, which is then used as a conclusory
label rather than an analytical factor. Two guards at Paseo Apartments
assaulted Hefner, who later won a state-court judgment against
complex owner Westhill Management, Inc., a Texas limited
partnership.522  Hefner then brought this action against Lasky, a
California resident and a limited partner in Westhill, seeking recovery
as a third-party beneficiary against two of Lasky's personal insurers.
523
The federal district court dismissed one of Lasky's insurers for
insolvency, 524 leaving Hefner's action against Republic Indemnity, a
California insurer. Republic moved for summary judgment on grounds
of nonliability, which turned on which state's law applied. The district
court first held that Texas Insurance Code article 21.42, which placed
the choice-of-law analysis under Duncan, 
525 did not control. 526
520. For the res's traceability, the court relied on a 1967 federal decision from
California and an 1884 United States Supreme Court case, both for the following state
law proposition: "It is well settled that the law of the situs of the trust governs the
trust." Id. at 551 (citing In re Dollard, 275 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1967);
Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U.S. 542, 546 (1884)). The court found that the proceeds of
the res had been delivered to the trustee in Texas and would thus be governed by
Texas law. Although this proposition no doubt has legal support, it fails to invoke
either a Texas choice-of-law rule or Texas substantive authority, contrary to Klaxon v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 488 (1941); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938); and Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex.
1984).
521. 773 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
522. See Westhill Mgmt., Inc. v. Hefner, No. 01-87-000617-CV, 1988 WL
46399, at * 1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston [l st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (affirming the trial
court's award of damages in the original case).
523. Hefner, 773 F. Supp. at 12-13.
524. Id. at 13.
525. Id. (citing Duncan, 665 S.W.2d 414).
526. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 2002) is a statutory choice-of-law
rule requiring the application of Texas law to certain Texas-based claims, no matter
what law the policy may designate. The Hefner court held that it applied only when:
(1) the insurance proceeds are payable to a Texas citizen (Californian Lasky was the
payee here); (2) the policy is issued by a company doing business in Texas (Republic
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In establishing the predicate for the choice-of-law analysis, the
court did not mention section 6 or its factors, but it did recite section
188's factors without attribution: the place of negotiation; the place of
signing; the place of performance; the location of the subject matter;
and the parties' domicile, residence, place of incorporation, and place
of business. 527 Applying this list to the facts, California's contacts were
considerable, and Texas was merely the place of the injury and the
528victim's home. Rather than apply these contacts to the policies in
section 6, the court concluded that "California has a more significant
relationship and a greater interest in having its law applied than
Texas. 529  Although the court included the term significant
relationship, it was used as an ultimate finding alongside greater
interest, without any consideration of section-6 policies.530 Hefner is
an example of contact-counting analysis packaged in a state-interest
conclusion, without applying the most-significant-relationship test. For
that matter, Hefner's only state-interest analysis was done through
contact counting. As with several other cases discussed in this Article,
Hefner's outcome is reasonable, but the approach is wrong, and the
discounting of Texas contacts and interests was too quickly done.
h. Grynberg Production Corp. v. British
Gas, P.L.C.53 '
did not); and (3) the claim arises in the course of the insurer's Texas business (the
court found it did not). 773 F. Supp. at 13 (citing Howell v. Am. Line Stock Ins. Co.,
483 F.2d 1354, 1360 (5th Cir. 1973) and other cases).
527. Hefner, 773 F. Supp. at 13.
528. One predicate the court did not recite is that "[t]he contacts with a particular
state are not determinative. Some contacts are more important than others because
they implicate particular state policies underlying the particular substantive issue.
Consequently, selection of the applicable law depends on the qualitative nature of the
contacts." Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421. With this in mind, the number of California
contacts is not as significant as what those contacts were, and the two Texas
contacts-place of injury and victim's home-should have led to more than a one-
paragraph choice-of-law analysis.
529. Hefner, 773 F. Supp. at 13.
530. In effect, the court did discuss the section 6(f) factor of certainty,
uniformity, and result predictability by noting that if the Republic policy were subject
to the laws of every state where Lasky owned property, then Lasky would be subject
to twenty different states' laws. Id. If that argument were valid, insurance policies
would be governed by the most favorable law, and statutes such as article 21.42 would
be disfavored.
531. 817 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
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This action involved a dispute over rights to develop oil
interests in Kazakhstan, complicated by the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991.532 Originally filed in a Texas state court in Jefferson County,
533
the defendant removed the case to federal court in Beaumont, and in
that removal, a choice-of-law issue arose. Specifically, the court had to
consider the possible applicability of Texas law and its application to
the issue of an employee tortfeasor and fraudulent party joinder.534
Kazakhi law held only the corporate entity liable for the claims
alleged; 535 Texas law provided a remedy against tortfeasing
employees. 536 In finding that Texas law possibly could apply at the
trial, the court cited to Duncan and Gutierrez and identified the most-
significant-relationship test,537 but it neither quoted nor cited any
section of the Second Restatement. Instead, the court conducted a
government-interest analysis in which contacts related only to various
states' interests.538 The court found that it was very possible that Texas
substantive law could apply to some issues, a situation that justified the
employees' presence in the suit for liability purposes, and thus,
destroyed diversity removal. 539 The case nonetheless was removable
on federal-question grounds under the well-pleaded-complaint rule.
540
In this interlocutory ruling on federal removal jurisdiction, the choice-
of-law analysis was somewhat tangential, directed only to the court's
lack of diversity jurisdiction, and the analysis was then mooted by the
presence of federal question jurisdiction. But the fact that this was a
dictum analysis does not diminish the importance of a federal court
accurately applying the local state's choice-of-law rule, especially
when it has potential jurisdictional significance.
i. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v.
Capece
541
This case, like Hefier,542 equates state-interest balancing with
contact counting, thus using state interests as a conclusory label for the
532. Id. at 1343-45.
533. Id. at 1345-46.
534. Id. at 1349-51.
535. Id. at 1350.
536. Grynberg Prod. Corp., 817 F. Supp. at 1349.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 1350-51.
539. Id. at 1351.
540. Id. at 1352-65.
541. 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
542. See supra Part III.B.2.g (discussing Hefner).
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state with the most contacts. Also like Hefner, this case failed to apply
the most-significant-relationship factors found in section 6, including a
proper examination of the Tennessee interests at stake. Unlike Hefner,
the real error here was in analyzing this as a tort rather than as a
property claim.
The case arose when Elvis Presley's estate sued Barry Capece
for his use of the name "The Velvet Elvis" for his Houston nightclub.
543
Along with the federal trademark infringement claims, the estate
brought a state-law claim over right of publicity, which, because
Presley's estate was in Tennessee, required a choice-of-law analysis.
544
The federal district court quoted both sections 6 and 145 (the general
tort principle) 545 and then examined the contacts listed in section 145 in
a one-paragraph analysis that concluded: "Since the 'locus of the
conduct' is in Texas, the Court believes that Texas has a 'greater
interest in seeing that its standard of care is applied' because of the
affect [sic] it will have on the way parties tailor their conduct within the
state.'546 The court reinforced this conclusion with section 145's
presumption that in tort cases, the law of the place of the conduct
ordinarily governs standards of conduct.547 True enough, Capece's
conduct was at issue, but right of privacy is a property claim, not a tort
claim.548 In fact, after using the Second Restatement's tort section to
choose Texas law, the court adjudicated the claim under Texas property
law. 549 For property rights, depending on the issue, the Restatement
gives additional weight to the property's situs,550 which of course, was
543. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 787-89.
544. Id. at 800.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 800 (quoting De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1414 (5th Cir.
1995)).
547. Id. at 801 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145
cmt. d (1971), which states: "Thus, subject only to rare exceptions, the local law of the
state where the conduct and injury occurred will be applied to determine whether the
actor satisfied minimum standards of acceptable conduct and whether the interest
affected by the actor's conduct was entitled to legal protection.").
548. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon 2000) (indicating that an
individual's right in the use of the individual's name, voice, likeness, etc. after death is
a property right in Texas).
549. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 801-03.
550. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 (governing
the validity and effect of conveyance of an interest in land). Section 223 provides that
the governing law is that which would be applied by the courts of the situs and adds
that this will usually be situs law. The Restatement does not have a section specific to




In addition to using the general tort principle (section 145) for a
property claim, the court fell into the trap of combining contact
counting with an interest-analysis conclusion that failed to consider the
real interests at stake. Those interests, including Tennessee's
governmental interests, might have come out had section 6 been
applied. Although the court found no compensable damage, plaintiff
obtained partial relief with a permanent injunction against Capece's
using Elvis's image, employing associated phrases, or displaying the
name "Elvis" in larger letters than those used for "Velvet."
551
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The proposition that one out of five Texas choice-of-law
opinions applies the wrong test requires proof, and that proof requires
an understanding of the distinctions in some of law's most abstract
principles. I hope I have made that proof, and in particular, that I have
established four points. First, governmental-interest analysis is a test
distinct from the Second Restatement's most-significant-relationship
test. Governmental interests matter in both tests, but they drive the
interest analysis. They merely serve as a factor in the Second
Restatement approach.
Second, Texas courts are inappropriately mixing Currie's
interest analysis with purported Restatement applications. Because
there is a national tendency to misapply the Second Restatement, 552 it
may be that having one out of five cases decided under Currie's interest
analysis is about right. But before accepting these misapplications as
inherent to modem choice-of-law analysis, consider the consequences.
Although some of these interest-analyzed decisions produce the same
results as the Second Restatement would, some invariably will not.
Overlooked choice-of-law components will change the outcome in
the general property principle.
551. The permanent injunction was directed to defendants' violations of both
federal and Texas law in their inappropriate use of Presley's name and likeness. Elvis
Presley Enters., Inc., 950 F. Supp. at 802. The court denied damages under both
federal and Texas law, and the opinion fails to state what damages might have been
available under Tennessee law. Id. Plaintiff's victory with the permanent injunction
was lessened by the fact that defendants had agreed to the injunction at trial. Id. at
801.
552. See supra notes 7, 187-90.
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some cases, often on summary judgment. This Article has attempted to
detect some possible outcome-determinative instances, but in many, it
will not be possible because the court's record will be developed
differently. Not only will the interest-analyzing court perceive facts
differently, but parties also will capitulate and fail to pursue Second
Restatement elements that do not end up in the calculation.
Third, test-mixing aside, interest analysis is a bad choice-of-law
method when used in its pure form. If Texas courts must use interest
analysis, we should opt for Professor Weintraub's approach, which
includes other elements such as avoiding unfair surprise to the
parties.553 Of the many difficulties of pure interest analysis, foremost is
the difficulty of ascertaining the pertinent interests in every case. Some
laws have clearly delineated boundaries, both in subject matter and
territorial application. Most do not. Interest-analyzing courts are prone
to unwarranted assumptions, such as State X's statute of repose being
intentionally limited to companies residing in State X.554 Because the
determination of interests is essential to Currie's approach-the test
goes nowhere without it-courts often must deduce foreign states'
interests without adequate foundation.
Fourth, in spite of this Article's criticism of interest analysis as
a choice-of-law method, that analysis has merit as one element in a
multifactored test. In particular, Professor Weintraub is correct to
caution against applying a foreign law without considering its content
and purpose, 555 any more than one would with forum law. But in doing
so, lawyers and judges should not impute legal purposes or speculate
about them. If the law's purpose is unclear, that law should be
neutrally applied to any fact pattern satisfying the constitutional
requirement of reasonable relation.556
553. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 352-53.
554. See Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 249 (discussed
supra Part IV.B. l.c).
555. WENTRAUIB, supra note 3, at 349.
556. The Constitution requires a reasonable relation between the dispute and the
state whose law is being applied. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,407-
08 (1930) (holding that Texas law cannot be applied to a contract formed outside of
Texas that is not to be performed in Texas without denying due process of law);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (ruling that choice of law
requires a state to have a significant contact, creating state interests such that the
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Paso 1989, writ denied)
Brown Servs., Inc. v. Fairbrother, 776 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.--Corpus
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Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
writ denied)
Adobe Res. Corp. v. Newmont Oil Co., 838 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)
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Beaumont 2002, pet. granted)
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APPENDIX B
Cases Citing Additional Second Restatement Sections
(by topic)
This appendix lists Texas state cases and federal cases in the
Fifth Circuit applying the Texas choice-of-law rule that considered
topic-specific sections of the Restatement (Second). A listing here does
not indicate good or bad use of the cited sections-only that they were
considered. Some cases are listed more than once because they used
multiple specific sections in different subject areas. The Restatement
(Second) section is noted parenthetically after each case.
* Starred cases also used some aspect of Currie's interest
analysis.
Additional Sections Cited Favorably
1. Torts
a. Fraud
Lutheran Bhd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 829 S.W.2d 300
(Tex. App.- Texarkana 1992, writ granted) (§ 148)
Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134 (5th
Cir. 1992) (§ 201)
Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. denied) (§ 148)
b. Defamation/Invasion of Privacy
Becker v. Computer Scis. Corp., 541 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (§§ 152, 153)
Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984)
(§ 153)
Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir.
1986) (§ 153)
Levine v. CMP Publ'ns, Inc., 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984) (§ 150)
Ritzmann v. Weekly World News, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1336
(N.D. Tex. 1985) (§§ 150, 153)
*Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D.
Tex. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 153)
c. Personal Injury/Wrongful Death
*Torrington v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829,848 (Tex. 2000) (§ 178)
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*Trailways, Inc. v. Clark, 794 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied) (§ 175)
*Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435 (5th
Cir. 1990) (applied § 178, mistakenly cited as § 175)
d. Workers Compensation (including conflicts with
personal injury/wrongful death claims)
Osborn v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1990, writ denied) (§ 184)
Lee v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Tex.
1992), aff'd, 32 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 1994) (§ 184)
Parra v. Larchmont Farms, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 93
(Tex. 1997) (§§ 183, 184)
Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex.
2000) (§ 184)
e. Tortious Conduct
CPS Int'l, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied) (§ 156)
f Contribution
Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817 S.W.2d 50
(Tex. 1991) (§ 173)
2. Contracts
a. Life Insurance
Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 86 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, no pet.) (§ 192)
b. Employment Law
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (§ 196)
Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817 S.W.2d 50
(Tex. 1991) (§ 196)
Salazar v. Coastal Corp., 928 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (§ 196)
Nunez v. Hunter Fan, 920 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (§ 196)
Perez v. Alcoa Fujikura, Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. Tex.
1997) (§ 196)
Young v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 1998 WL 285901 (Tex.
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Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980)
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Houston [14thDist.] 1987), rev'd, 793 S.W.2d 670 (§§ 133,
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